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ABSTRACT 
In the nearly thirty years following the Islamic Revolution, two opposing forces – 
an isolated conservative theocracy versus globalization – struggling to coexist, placed 
Iran in a precarious position to either move back toward the traditional ideologies that 
prompted such a radical transformation, away from the pressures, challenges and 
interdependencies created through globalization, or to participate more actively in the 
outside world.  The religious establishment or ulama play the most significant role in the 
dichotomy between Iran’s theocratic conservatism and the position Iran takes in 
globalization.   
The modern history of Iran is replete with examples of the ulama actively 
participating in the political economy of the country, usually acting with their own 
interests in mind.  Despite basing their actions within the theology and jurisprudence of 
Shi’a Islam, significant space exists with the principles of Islamic economic thought to 
allow the ulama in Iran to lead their country into the global economy.  Yet the 
uncertainties and diffusion of power brought about through the processes of globalization 
keep the religious establishment from doing so in an effort to maintain their control over 
all Iranian institutions captured after the revolution. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis will examine the dichotomy between Iran’s theocratic conservatism 
and the role Iran plays in globalization.  In the nearly thirty years following the Islamic 
Revolution, these two opposing forces struggling to coexist place Iran in a precarious 
position to either move back toward  the traditional ideologies that prompted such a 
radical transformation, away from the pressures, challenges and interdependencies 
created through globalization or to participate more actively in the outside world.  How 
can Iran integrate into the international political economy if its theocracy, lead by 
religious conservatives, resists globalization?  Through what mechanisms will Iran 
embrace its role in globalization?  What function do foremost Shi’a ulama1 have in 
shaping Iran’s political economy?   
To study Iran’s position in the international political economy this thesis will 
explore the economic challenges facing Iran through the pressures applied by 
globalization and survey the economic theory of Shi’a Islam to determine under what 
framework globalization can exist within the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
In 1979, a growing populist movement initiated by an exiled Ayatollah brought 
Iran from the rule of a pro-western monarch into a belligerent Islamic Republic.  While 
throughout the history of Iran, the ulama have played an active role in the political 
economy, the Iranian Revolution (or Islamic Revolution as it is sometimes referred to), 
“marked the first time (in history) that Muslim clerics harnessed the power of their 
                                                 
1 In his thesis, Brian P. Maynard uses the Arabic word ulama as “a collective term referring to the 
members of the Islamic religious establishment including scholars, preachers, and teachers. Though the 
terms cleric and clergy are not completely analogous with ulama, they have been used extensively in 
western studies and are used synonymously in this work,” as well.  Brian P. Maynard, “The Role of the 
Ulama in Shiite Social Movements:  Bahrain, Lebanon and Iraq,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2005), 1.   
 2
religious authority to replace a secular, modern state with a theocracy.”2  Almost 
overnight Iranian society became infused with new social, economic, political and 
military pressures which would determine not only the strength of the emerging state as a 
Middle Eastern regional power, but also its future as a symbol of influence in the 
international environment. 
While the Islamic Republic of Iran wields tremendous regional importance, “as a 
country of 70 million people, with a history of three thousand years of statehood, 
substantial oil and gas resources, and a rich and influential culture,”3 its significance in a 
globalized international economy is virtually non-existent.4  Iran sits at a cross-road of 
two potentially destabilizing forces threatening to pull the country apart.  On one hand 
the ulama persist in keeping Iran inaccessible through isolationist political and economic 
policies, while on the other hand, markets forces seek to penetrate and expose Iran to the 
rest of the world.  A quarter of a century after the Revolution, reform minded leaders 
“sought (to bring Iran) greater liberty and democracy,” however, the June 2005 election 
of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad “dealt a serious blow to the reform movement in 
Iran,”5 and brought the resurgence of the uncompromising theocratic politics of the 
Supreme Council of Guardians and ensuing economic policies of the new government.   
Iran must not only deal with increased domestic pressure over a stagnant economy 
and suppressed civil liberties and personal freedoms of a growing population, but also 
international pressure over its nuclear program, support to international terrorism 
including  Hezbollah in the Levant and accusations of assisting militant Shi’a groups in 
Iraq as well.  The pressure brought on by globalization, namely the opening up of its 
economy and society to an external political economy further serve to exacerbate the 
                                                 
2 John Baylis and Steve Smith, “Conflict Without Victory: The Iran Iraq War,” Case Studies of 
Contemporary Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2007), 
http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199289783/01student/cases/iran_iraq_war.pdf, (accessed January 24, 
2008). 
3 Ali Mohammadi, Iran Encountering Globalization: Problems and Prospects (London: Routledge 
Curzon, 2003), xii. 
4 Iran placed last out of 62 countries in A.T. Kearney’s 2006 Globalization Index published in Foreign 
Policy.   
5 Patrick O’Neil, Karl Fields and Don Share, “Iran,” Cases in Comparative Politics (New York: 
Norton and Company, 2006), 313. 
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problem which casts Iran in an “uncertain fate whose future will profoundly affect its 
surrounding region”6 that classifies the Islamic Republic as a pivotal state in American 
foreign policy considerations. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The problems and issues raised by my major research questions are threefold.  
The first problem derives from the principle role leading Shi’a ulama have in shaping 
Iran’s political economy – which is their influence on the government in determining 
fiscal and monetary policy as well as bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.  As the 
literature demonstrates, a distinguishing feature of Iran’s political economy is the active 
role played by the religious clergy, not only before the Islamic revolution, but afterwards, 
despite Ayatollah Khomeini’s quip that, “economics is for donkeys,” and that they did 
not overthrow the Shah “just to lower the price of watermelons.”  As the literature will 
indicate, the ulama are not a homogenous group with disagreements occurring over 
Islamic theology and over economic strategies.  Conservative elements argue for increase 
isolationism, while both pragmatists and reformists both lean towards varying degrees of 
economic liberalization.  Thus, a preliminary conclusion would indicate a resistance to 
modernization through the process of globalization exists within the conservative 
leadership of the religious ranks, however the forces and pressures exerted upon Iran will 
transcend the traditional ideologies and usher in a new era of economic growth within the 
Islamic Republic. 
The second problem deals with determining Iran’s place in the global economy 
despite multilateral sanctions imposed by the United Nations (UN) over Iran’s reluctance 
to give up its ongoing nuclear program as well as unilateral sanctions imposed by the 
United States since the 1980s.  The sanctions, in effect, inevitably limit Iran from 
participating fully in the global economy, yet globalization weakens the potential impact 
of sanctions “by increasing the number of ways that sanctions can be circumvented,”7 as 
                                                 
6 Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill and Paul Kennedy, “Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy,” Foreign 
Affairs 75, No 1, (January/February 1996): 33. 
7 Lance Davis and Stanley Engerman, “History Lessons: Sanctions: Neither War nor Peace,” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 17, No. 2, (Spring, 2003): 196. 
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evidenced by the nearly 40 percent of Iran’s trade with both the European Union and 
China combined.  Therefore, a potential hypothesis is, despite economic sanctions, levied 
by the UN and U.S.; these alone do not limit Iran’s participation in the global economy. 
The final problem relates to the nature and definition of globalization.  To some in 
the Muslim world globalization manifests as a Western or even American ideal whose 
place in the Middle East is not yet realized, or even understood.  As globalization takes 
shape throughout the world, the Middle East is caught in a precarious position. While the 
merits of globalization and free trade bring about economic growth and development, it 
can also threaten culture and tradition while causing a rise in vulnerability, uncertainty 
and political instability.  With globalization comes a mixing of markets, culture and 
nations to create a new economic system.  In a region that does not particularly respond 
well to change, globalization is likely to make certain parts and societal group – namely 
the Shi’a ulama of Iran – uncomfortable.  Thus, to accept globalization would be to 
abandon their traditional social values. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Islamic Republic of Iran can trace the history of its statehood in one form or 
another for over three thousand years.  During that time the lands encompassing Iran 
have enjoyed splendid isolation while hosting the rise and fall of empires and dynasties, 
monarchies and constitutional reforms culminating in the Islamic Revolution that formed 
the modern day republic.  Central to Iran’s history is the role played by the ulama or 
religious clerical leaders and part of the religious establishment of Shi’a Islam.   
The ulama are more than just the religious clergy; they represent countless years 
of study in traditional Islamic scholarship, becoming a part of the educated class 
“responsible for shouldering the task of ministering to the community’s religious needs as 
well as its social and political interests.”8  The Shi’a ulama are those “who have acquired 
sufficient knowledge to be able to understand and interpret religious text and Islamic 
                                                 
8 Vali Nasr, The Shi’a Revival, (New York: W.W. Norton and Co, 2006), 67. 
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laws”9 and “became functional replacements for the authority of the imams.”10  The 
source of reverence and emulation (taqlid) comes not only “for their knowledge, but for 
the link to the Twelfth Imam that they represent.”11  Though a hierarchical system within 
the ulama exists based on stature of instructors, religious credentials and number of 
followers, there is no one leader among them. 
While the lofty title of ayatollah (the sign of God) is accorded “without ceremony 
in which the office is formally bestowed,”12 to an alim by his peers based on years of 
study and religious writings, where “the most senior clergy (elevate to) sources of 
emulation.”13  An ayatollah, while well versed in matters of Islamic law and 
jurisprudence, is also a well-rounded scholar on other issues outside of religion, such as 
philosophy, economics – or increasingly in Iran’s case – politics.   
With this title comes the ability to write statements of religious discourse and 
issue fatwas, or religious edicts that offer “a practical solution, a way out, addressed to 
the problems, paradoxes, anomalies and puzzles that life throws up constantly in the face 
of the faithful,”14  to his followers or to all followers if bestowed the title of Grand 
Ayatollah.   “Even if ulama considered that they could not change Shari’a Law itself, 
ample room for interpretation remains through fatwas,”15 and under taqlid, these fatwas 
must be followed or risk committing “a crime against the Imam.”16  The ulama, however, 
do not have a complete monopoly on religious discourse. 
                                                 
9 Mansoor Moaddel, “The Shi’i Ulama and the State in Iran,” Theory and Society 15, No. 4, (July 
1986): 548. 
10 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival, 66-67. 
11 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival, 68. 
12 Brendan I. Koerner, “How Shiite Clerics Earn the Name,” http://www.slate.com (accessed August 
17, 2008). 
13 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival, 70. 
14 Sadik J. al-Azm, “Is the Fatwa a Fatwa,” Middle East Report 83, Political Islam, (July/August 
1993): 27. 
15 Nikki R. Keddie, “Iran: Change in Islam; Islam and Change,” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 11, No. 4,. (July 1980): 528. 
16 Abbas Kadhim, statement at seminar attended by author, Monterey, CA, February 4, 2008. 
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The Islamic intelligentsia, though not members of the clerical religious 
establishment, also contribute to this discourse.  In secular Western society, Weber 
considers the intelligentsia, “the classes privileged through property and education,”17 
however, in Iran the term identifies “the educated, middle class Islamic intellectuals with 
a responsibility and a duty to build a modern Islamic society in Iran.”18  Feeling 
disconnected with the ulama due to their different methods of Islamic learning, this group 
of people, though devote Shi’a Muslims, were critical of the ulama and “accused them of 
becoming part of the ruling class, of institutionalizing revolutionary Shi’ism, and thereby 
transforming it into a highly conservative religion.”19  According to the Islamic 
Intelligentsia, the ulama were not capable of leading a return to true Islam.  To placate 
these individuals, members of the ulama united with the intelligentsia during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century against un-Islamic rulers.  The ulama “formulated 
an ideology that sought to appeal to the intelligentsia by harmonizing Islamic injunctions 
with pluralistic precepts,”20 yet remained distinctive through their exceptional religious 
perspective. 
The individual character, level of scholarship and political involvement make 
each member of the ulama unique.  To disregard “the persistent political divisions with 
the ulama”21 in treating them as a collective does disservice to the individual who has 
gained wisdom through decades of learning, study, experience and writing.  These central 
figures have been a part of Iran’s history since the middle of the last millennium. 
 
                                                 
17 Max Weber, Economy and Society, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 462. 
18 Riaz Hassan, “Iran’s Islamic Revolutionaries: Before and after the Revolution,” Third World 
Quarterly 6, No. 3, (July 1984): 680. 
19 Riaz Hassan, “Iran’s Islamic Revolutionaries: Before and after the Revolution,” Third World 
Quarterly 6, No. 3, (July 1984): 680. 
20 Ray Takeyh, “Review of Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran by 
Vanessa Martin,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 78, No. 2, 
(April 2002), 414. 
21 Mansoor Moaddel, “The Shi’i Ulama and the State in Iran,” Theory and Society 15, No. 4, (July 
1986):  520. 
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The literature is ripe with history on the transition of the Safavid Empire to 
Shi’ism under Shah Ismail in the sixteenth century as well as the early Safavid rulers who 
sought to covert both Sunni Muslims and non-Muslims alike to Shi’a Islam.  Reinforcing 
that the people should follow the religion of their rulers, “Shi’a ulama from Iran, 
Lebanon and Bahrain were brought to Iran as missionaries and became part of the state-
created and controlled Shi’a religious establishment.”22  Having a ruler practicing the 
same religion as the population brought legitimacy to that rule, as well as offered the 
ulama complete endorsement from the state for its political and economic policies.  The 
roots of the Shi’a ulama were now entrenched in the state of Iran having “retained their 
autonomous religious authority as well as their control over appreciable resources.”23 
In an unusual showcase of political power, not seen among contemporaries in 
other prominently Sunni Muslim countries, “one of the distinguishing features of Iranian 
political history is the active role played by the Shi’a ulama in virtually all the country’s 
historically significant political and economic events.”24  Religious institutions, 
especially those with an integral part of the national heritage, “are the most effective 
systems of communication, and religious leaders who are often more devoted, efficient 
and intelligent than government officials, cannot be ignored.”25  This history showcases 
the evolution of power structures tied to both social and economic changes that have 
reduced the power of certain social classes at the same time increasing the power of 
others.26   
The literature on ulama/state economic relations in Iran from a historical context 
seeks to determine the nature of that relationship through explanatory models.  Mansoor 
Moaddell rejects both the ideological model and the modernization model in favor of one 
 
                                                 
22 John Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 63. 
23 Said A. Arjomand, “Iran's Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective,” World Politics 38, No. 
3, (April 1986): 389. 
24 Mansoor Moaddel, “The Shi’i Ulama and the State in Iran,” Theory and Society 15, No. 4, (July 
1986): 519. 
25 Mark Juergensmeyer, “The New Religious State,” Comparative Politics 27, No. 4. (July 1995): 384.  
26 Nikki R. Keddie, “The Iranian Power Structure and Social Change 1800-1969: An Overview,” 
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 2, no. 1, (January 1971):  3. 
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that emphasizes class conflicts.27  The ideological model taken from Hamid Algar argues, 
“ulama political behavior under varying historical conditions can indeed be explained by 
the political teachings of Shi’ism.”28   
Under the modernization model, the actions of the ulama occur within the context 
of modernization – namely the ulama’s resistance to these processes.29  Modernization, 
with its connotations of secularism, “is generally understood as a process of change 
mainly caused by the increasing penetration of the world capitalist system in to Iran,”30 
naturally evokes a response by the ulama as “the ulama are the principle agents of 
traditionalism whose ‘distinctive feature in twentieth century Iran is that it has been a 
general movement for the defense of Islam against Western influence.”31  This model 
implies, “an inverse correlation between ulama power and the growth of a strong 
government,” exists while the ulama’s “opposition to the state comes from (their) 
attempts to protect their social, cultural and economic privileges.”32  In this context, the 
ulama view globalization as a modern, Western ideal which must be rejected. 
What these two models do not explain or take into consideration are the ulama’s 
relationships with social classes, specifically, “how changes in ulama political behavior 
could be produced by changing class relations”33 under varying economic conditions.  
This context considers the ulama as a special social category, whose “distinctive unifying 
                                                 
27 Mansoor Moaddel, “The Shi’i Ulama and the State in Iran,” Theory and Society 15, No. 4, (July 
1986): 519. 
28 Mansoor Moaddel, “The Shi’i Ulama and the State in Iran,” Theory and Society 15, No. 4, (July 
1986): 519. 
29 Mansoor Moaddel, “The Shi’i Ulama and the State in Iran,” Theory and Society 15, No. 4, (July 
1986): 519. 
30 Mohammad H. Faghfoory, “The Ulama-State Relations in Iran: 1921-1941,” International Journal 
of Middle Eastern  Studies 19, No. 4 (November 1987): 413. 
31 Said A. Arjomand, “Traditionalism in Twentieth Century Iran,” as quoted by Mansoor Moaddel, 
“The Shi’i and the State in Iran,” Theory and Society 15, No. 4, (July 1986): 520. 
32 Mansoor Moaddel, “The Shi’i Ulama and the State in Iran,” Theory and Society 15, No. 4, (July 
1986): 520. 
33 Mansoor Moaddel, “The Shi’i Ulama and the State in Iran,” Theory and Society 15, No. 4, (July 
1986): 520. 
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religious and occupational functions set them apart from the rest of society.”34  This 
model regards the ulama as a heterogeneous group consisting of various factions, vice 
what “virtually all scholars that consider the ulama a homogeneous group.”35 
Following the Revolution in 1979, the ulama under the supervision of Ayatollah 
Khomeini composed the Revolutionary Committee for Economic Policy and established 
a nine-point program to guide the economy in post revolutionary Iran.  From the genesis 
of taking a relatively healthy economy able to service foreign debts by reviving oil output 
had, by 1980, deteriorated into “fierce contests between secular and religious forces 
shaping the post-Shah economy into one of eventual slow down and decline.”36  The 
1979 Islamic Revolution marked the beginning of isolationist policy which hindered 
relationships with not only the region’s Sunni governments, but also from the rest of the 
world.  
The post-revolutionary architects consisting of both ulama and religious intelligentsia 
imbedded new government institutions within the framework of the Iranian constitution 
which created the modern day theocratic, religious state.  Out of Khomeini’s vision under the 
principle of guardianship of the jurist (velayat-e faqih) came the office of the Supreme 
Leader, the Assembly of Experts, the Council of Guardians, the Expediency Council, the 
Supreme National Security Council, the Central Bank and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC).  These institutions (see Figure 1), dominated by the ulama, play a significant 
role in “creating order and reducing uncertainty,”37 and combined with economics, “set the 
incentive structure and shape the direction of economic change towards growth, stagnation or 
decline.”38  These institutions served to promote theocratic conservatism while at the same 
time restrict Iran’s role in the emerging global economy.   
                                                 
34 Mansoor Moaddel, “The Shi’i Ulama and the State in Iran,” Theory and Society 15, No. 4, (July 
1986): 520. 
35 Mansoor Moaddel, “The Shi’i Ulama and the State in Iran,” Theory and Society 15, No. 4, (July 
1986): 520. 
36 Abbas Alnasrawi, “Economic Consequences of the Iraq-Iran War,” Third World Quarterly 8, No. 3, 
(July 1986):  871. 
37 Douglas C. North, “Institutions,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, No. 1, (Winter 1991): 97. 




Figure 1.   Structure of Iranian Government.39 
The clerical composition of Iran’s governmental institutions varies from very few 
to its entirety.  While the Supreme Leader and Assembly of Experts are composed 
entirely of members of the ulama, the Council of Guardians and Expediency Council 
consist of fifty percent and forty-two percent respectively.40  The makeup of the 
Parliament changes from election to election, but has been around thirty percent of the 
290 seats.41  Members of the ulama comprise twenty percent of the Supreme National 
Security Council and five percent of the executive cabinet.42  While current (as of 2008) 
                                                 
39 Red highlights by author; figure from Kenneth Katzman, “Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy 
Responses,” CRS Report for Congress,  RL32048, Updated March 7, 2008, 54.   
40 Percentages calculated from open source news reporting from Iran News Daily (http:// 
http://www.irannewsdaily.com), Pars Times (http://www.parstimes.com) and the Open Source Center 




Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is not part of the religious establishment, his 
two predecessors, Mohammad Khatami and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, are both 
Shi’a ulama.  The Supreme Leader commands the Joint Headquarters of the Iranian 
armed forces which include both regular military and the Revolutionary Guard.  With 
nearly absolute control over every governmental institution, the ulama are in key 
positions to not only screen the secular and religious candidates alike running for elected 
positions, but also draft, arbitrate, pass and execute laws which pertain to the political 
economy of Iran. 
While some of today’s economists consider Iran as having one of strongest 
performing economies in the Middle East based on economic growth rates, others cite 
inefficiency in the oil sector, wasteful public spending, corruption, inflation, high 
unemployment, and lack of development in non-petroleum related sectors as signs of a 
stagnant economy which has squandered much of its oil revenue.  Reminiscent of 
Mohammed Reza Shah’s extravagant spending of oil revenues exceeding fifteen percent 
of GDP during the militarization of Iran during the 1970s,43 so do Iran’s current leaders 
propagate uneven economic development with spending along parochial lines plaguing 
the country with inequalities in education, jobs and economic status.  The Fund for Peace 
cites one third of the national income rests in the hands of only ten percent of the 
population with an increasing gap in the rural-urban divide as a lack of even the most 
basic of services are more rampant in the rural areas.44   
Patterns of progressive economic decline such as double-digit inflation, small 
business failures, decreased trade revenue, capital flight and limited direct foreign 
investment exist despite increasing oil revenues through increased oil prices, and “while 
(Iran’s) economic performance has improved over the last several years, there has been 
little progress made in alleviating poverty or unemployment.”45  In addition to bilateral 
economic sanctions imposed by the United States, Iran’s economy suffers under 
                                                 
43 Morteza Gharehbaghian, “Oil Revenue and the Militarisation of Iran: 1960-1978,” Social Scientist 
15, No. 4/5, (April/May 1987): 98. 
44 Fund for Peace, “Iran Country Profile,” http://www.fundforpeace.org, (accessed January 26, 2008). 
45 Robert E. Looney, “The Re-Emergence of Iranian Petro-Populism,” Gulf Research Center, Gulf 
Yearbook 2006/2007, (Dubai: GRC, 2007), 417. 
 12
multilateral economic sanctions levied by the United Nations.  As Iran continues 
developing its nuclear program, these sanctions are not likely to be lifted in the near 
future. 
Since the revolution of 1979, the Supreme Leader and his Council of Guardians 
work in the background to override political leaders and decide the economic fate of a 
state and its population of over 70 million people supported by an economy fueled by 
rising oil revenues that cannot maintain growth, curb unemployment or inflation, or limit 
wide-spread poverty reaching both rural and urban areas.  The indications of a state 
caught in the dichotomy between theocratic conservatism and increasing globalization 
remains – replete with international pressures over a budding nuclear program and 
support to international terrorist organizations and domestic pressures over a deteriorating 
economy and limited political freedoms.  That being said, Iran remains a pivotal state 
whose position between the two fronts on the Global War on Terrorism has “the capacity 
to affect regional and international stability” and whose demise “would spell trans-
boundary mayhem.”46 
This thesis adds to the body of knowledge and attempts to close the “black hole” 
on a part of Iranian society and politics47 by addressing the role of the traditional ulama 
and state relations in Iran by looking at their role in influencing Iran’s decision to 
transition into or away from the world economy through the process of globalization.  As 
the economic train of globalization is not likely to come off its tracks anytime soon, hard-
line, conservative and moderate Shi’a clerics who support economic growth must 
continue to elucidate debate over the benefits of globalization.  The West must allow Iran 
to accept globalization on its terms and not force Western ideals and their negative 
connotations on a reluctant leadership.  
                                                 
46 Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill and Paul Kennedy, “Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy,” Foreign 
Affairs 75, No 1, (January/February 1996):37. 
47Henry Precht, “Ayatollah Realpolitik,” Foreign Policy, No. 70, (Spring 1988): 109. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The development of the Iranian revolutionary economy to determine under what 
framework globalization can exist within the Islamic Republic, presents an ideal case 
study.  Taking a macroeconomic approach to the study of Iran, the research will be 
focused on the structure, performance and behavior of the economy, while not only 
taking market forces into account, but also the intervention of those forces which exist 
outside the market – namely those stemming from theocratic conservatism pervasive not 
only among the Guardian Council, but also with the executive and legislative branches of 
the Iranian government. 
Source materials for this research will be acquired in several forms.  A collation 
of relevant primary sources from economic indices produced by international and 
domestic institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade 
Organization, United Nations, Central Bank of Iran and multinational corporations will 
be utilized to group related items of information together.  These include economic 
indicators such as growth rates, inflation, interest and investment, unemployment, 
balance of payments, foreign currency reserves, national debt and price indices.  Also, 
primary source materials containing interpretations of Shi’a economic theory written by 
classic and modern thinkers alike, along with leading Grand Ayatollahs and Ayatollahs 
will be examined.  To evaluate their reliability and relevance, secondary sources will 
include books, journals and articles written by experts in political economy, free trade, 
economic cooperation and Islamic economics and finance.  Throughout the course of this 
project, analysis will be conducted in an effort to establish the significance and 
implications of this research as it applies directly to the major problems and hypotheses 
identified in this thesis. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will be organized into five chapters with the conclusion comprising the 
fifth and final chapter.  The scheme of logic for addressing the problems and issues raised 
by the research question is as follows:  
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Chapter I contains the introduction which states the purpose and importance of the 
research being undertaken.  The literature review will survey the important academic 
literature on ulama/state economic relations as well as domestic and foreign perceptions 
of the strength of Iranian economic development and how these two factors collide under 
globalization.  Introducing the main players – the ulama – will demonstrate how their 
roles in shaping the past, present and future affect the Iranian political economy. 
Chapter II will look at Islamic economic theory from classical and modern 
thinkers, how it is applied in Iran and whether or not globalization has a place in the 
political economy of Iran.   
Chapter III examines the influence of the ulama over the economic policies of the 
state compared over significant events in Iranian history beginning in 1891 with the 
Tobacco Protests through the Islamic Revolution of 1979.  The second half of this 
chapter will detail the evolution of Iran’s post revolutionary economy through four 
different stages.  At each stage the influence of the religious leadership on Iran’s role in 
the global economy will be evaluated.  It is important to first establish the history behind 
why Iran behaves as it does in the global economy before tackling the components of 
globalization. 
Chapter IV examines the forces of globalization in Iran through the creation of 
complex economic interdependencies created through market integration and expansion, 
or lack thereof, as evidenced by Iran’s ranking on major indices measuring globalization 
and economic freedom.  The prospects of free trade agreements, involvement of both 
inter-governmental and non-governmental intuitions and multinational corporations will 
be explored.  A section on the impact of economic sanctions in this process will also be 
covered. 
Chapter V summarizes the findings of this thesis and offers the conclusion that 
significant space exists with the principles of Islamic economic thought, to allow the 
Shi’a ulama in Iran to lead their country into the global economy, yet the uncertainties 
and diffusion of power brought about through the processes of globalization keep them 
from doing so in an effort to maintain their firm on power captured after the revolution. 
 15
II. ISLAMIC ECONOMIC THOUGHT ON GLOBALIZATION 
Since early Safavid rules brought Shi’a clerics to Persia, the economy of Iran has 
long links to established Islamic economic thought.  Since the Islamic Revolution, this 
thought has been dominated by the ulama closest to the Supreme Leader and Iran’s 
religiously dominated political institutions.  As an Islamic Republic, “Islam not only 
comprises a set of principles and doctrine that guide a Muslim’s relationship with God 
and with society, but also sets forth a code of conduct which regulates and organizes 
mankind in both spiritual and material life.”48  The traditionally educated religious clergy 
play an ever increasing role in modern society, developing the relationship between man 
and God, advancing that code which dictates the nature of that relationship, while slowly 
adapting to the challenges and complexities of operating a modern political economy 
within an increasing bureaucratic and dominant state.  In Iran, incorporating Islamic 
economic thought towards the process of globalization is held back in favor of a view of 
economics which seeks to strengthen the religious establishment’s firm grip on not only 
political, but also economic power and social control. 
Iran is caught in a position of uncertainty as the forces of globalization move 
throughout the world. While the merits of globalization and free trade bring about 
economic growth and development, it carries a stigma of vulnerability, which includes 
cultural change and political instability.  With globalization comes a mixing of markets, 
culture and nations to create a new social order – in direct conflict with the one 
established and maintained since 1979.  To those that do not react well to changes, 
globalization is likely to make certain members of the ulama uncomfortable.  To accept 
globalization would be to abandon their traditional social and economic values.  Can 
Muslim clerics find value in the benefits of globalization through Islamic economic 
thought?  Or is globalization, seen as another Western ideal with connotations thrust upon 
a reluctant population, incongruent with Islam?  
                                                 
48 John R. Presley and John G. Sessions, “Islamic Economics: The Emergence of a New Paradigm,” 
The Economic Journal 104, No. 424, (May 1994): 585. 
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If principles of Islamic economics encourage trade and enterprise, yet restricts 
self-interest and undue profiteering, does Islamic economics include, by extension, 
building a relationship between the individual and community through cooperation to the 
global economy? 
In order to determine whether or not globalization has a place in the political 
economy of Iran, this chapter will examine the principles of Islamic economics and 
finance under the Shari’a in the proper paradigm as they relate to the components of 
economic integration.  The components include actual economic flows, trade and capital 
restrictions, market growth and development and state interference in those markets.  The 
elements of actual flows consist of trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio 
investment and income payments to foreign nationals, while import barriers, tariffs, taxes 
and capital account limits encompass the restrictions.  Despite Islam’s emphasis on the 
promotion of equality, social welfare and rejection of excess consumption and 
materialism within the Muslim community (umma) much room exists for greater 
integration into the world economy through globalization.    
A. THE PARADIGM OF ISLAMIC ECONOMICS 
For the traditionally educated ulama to get past the perception of globalization as 
a Western ideal born out of liberal capitalism, it must be presented within the paradigm of 
Islamic economics.  This paradigm is not new, however, and if traced back to the Qur’an, 
economics based on Islam “is much older than the theoretical foundations of most 
Western economic paradigms.”49  Accompanying this paradigm is terminology routed in 
philosophic foundations: 
i) tawhid: God's unity and sovereignty.  
ii) rububiyyah: divine arrangements for nourishment and directing things 
towards their perfection.  
iii) khilafah: man's role as God's vicegerent on the earth.  
iv) tazkiyah: purification plus growth.  
                                                 
49 John R. Presley and John G. Sessions, “Islamic Economics: The Emergence of a New Paradigm,” 
The Economic Journal 104, No. 424, (May 1994): 585. 
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v) Accountability: belief in accountability on the day of judgment and its 
implications for the life in this world and in the hereafter. 
vi) falah:  attaining success through happiness by acquiring that which one 
desires or what is good.50 
Rejecting previously iterated definitions of Islamic economics51, for one which 
favors a statement of the basic economic problem, Muhammad Arif offers, “Islamic 
economics as the study of a Muslim’s behavior who organizes the resources, which are a 
trust, to achieve falah.”52  This definition implies that actors within a Muslim society 
establish the Shari’a as the basic foundation guiding economic thought.  Therefore, an 
Islamic economic system subjected to the Shari’a with philosophic foundations of 
“accountability and individualism in the role of vicegerent to Allah with an objective to 
achieve falah, not only in this world, but in the Hereafter,”53 replaces the capitalist 
economic system operating under a market economy paradigm under “utilitarian 
individualism based on laissez faire philosophy.”54 Under this paradigm, “falah can be 
used to affect aggregate demand (AD) of an Islamic economy:”55 
 AD = Y = C + I + G + (X – M) + falah 
where: 
Y = real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
C = subsistence level of consumption plus desirable consumption, that is 
over and above which is required for subsistence but within the limits 
prescribed by the Shari’a. 
I = investment 
G = government spending 
 
                                                 
50 Muhammad Arif, “Toward a Definition of Islamic Economics: Some Scientific Considerations,” 
Journal of Research in Islamic Economics 2, No. 2 (Winter, 1985): 80-81. 
51 See, for example, Akram Khan, “Islamic Economics: Nature and Need,” and S.M. Hasanuz Zaman, 
“Definition of Islamic Economics,” in Journal of Research in Islamic Economics 1, No. 2, (Winter, 1984). 
52 Muhammad Arif, “Toward a Definition of Islamic Economics: Some Scientific Considerations,” 
Journal of Research in Islamic Economics 2, No. 2 (Winter, 1985): 87. 
53 Ibid., 92. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 86. 
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(X – M) = net exports of goods and services 
falah = direct voluntary spending for the sake of Allah56 
The view which contends economics must exist within an Islamic paradigm is 
also expressed by Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr.57  However, al-Sadr’s definition of Islamic 
economics concentrates on justice, especially within the Islamic community, rather than 
an individual seeking success: 
…the way Islam prefers to follow in the pursuit of its economic life and in 
the solution of its practical economic problems in line with its concept of 
justice.58 
Taken from the Qur’an social justice is tantamount to any solution of these problems: 
…we have already sent Our messengers with clear evidences and sent 
down with them the Scripture and the balance that the people may 
maintain their affairs in justice…59 
The nature of al-Sadr’s economic thought created a new socio-economic order 
based neither on socialism nor capitalism.  Others, such as Muhammad Iqbal, regarded 
Islam, “as the middle path between the alien capitalist spirit which strikes at the root of 
exploitation and the harmful, coercive policies of socialism.”60  The contributions of al-
Sadr detail the behavior of markets, handling of transactions, distribution of wealth and 
well as the role of the state in economic affairs.  Despite his justification of economics in 
terms of moral values, “he believed that there were natural universal laws of economics, 
                                                 
56 Equation for AD from Thomas A. Pugel, International Economics, Thirteenth Edition, (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 2007), 521-522.  Integration of falah from Muhammad Arif, “Toward a Definition of 
Islamic Economics: Some Scientific Considerations,” Journal of Research in Islamic Economics 2, No. 2 
(Winter, 1985): 86. 
57 Al-Sadr (1935-1980 AD) was an Iraqi-born religious cleric who achieve the rank of Grand 
Ayatollah and published his seminal work on Islamic economic thought in Iqtisaduna: Our Economics, 
(Tehran: World Organization for Islamic Services, 1982). 
58 Al-Sadr as quoted by Rodney Wilson in “The Contributions of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr to 
Contemporary Islamic Economic Thought,” Journal of Islamic Studies 9, No. 1, (1998): 47.   
59 Seheeh International, ed., The Qur’an: English Meanings, (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Al-Muntada al-
Islami, 2004), 57:25. 
60 Muhammad Iqbal, “Recent Works on History of Economic Thought in Islam: A Survey,” Islamic 
Economics, http://islamic-world.net/economics (accessed September 28, 2008). 
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such as supply and demand and the notion of diminishing returns, which could not be 
disregarded as they explained economic phenomena and events,”61 however, the 
foundation of his economic ethics lies within Islamic law.  With the Shari’a as the basis 
for Islamic economic thought, a system which allows for the tenants of globalization can 
be created.  
B. PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC GLOBAL ECONOMICS UNDER THE 
SHARI’A 
The ethics which guide Islamic economics, create a system which is not only 
compatible with Islamic law, but also, as with all other aspects of life, a means of 
achieving success (falah), or simply the maximization of utility although achieving 
market equilibrium is not the goal of Islamic economics as the promotion of social justice 
dominates the discussions of its basic principles.   
Discussions of Islamic economics can be found “buried in the vast literature on 
the exegesis of the Qur’an (tafsir), commentaries on the life and times of Muhammad 
(Hadith), principles of jurisprudence (usal al-fiqh), and the law (fiqh).”62  From 
purveyors of classical Islamic thought,63 to modern theorists64 and international 
                                                 
61 Rodney Wilson, “The Contributions of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr to Contemporary Islamic 
Economic Thought,” Journal of Islamic Studies 9, No. 1, (1998): 48-49. 
62 “Recent Works on History of Economic Thought in Islam: A Survey,” Islamic Economics, 
http://islamic-world.net/economics (accessed September 30, 2008). 
63 See, for example, Zaid bin Ali (699-738 AD), Abu Hanifa (699-767 AD), Al-Awaza’I (707-774 
AD), Malik (717-796 AD), Abu Yusuf (731-798 AD), Muhammad bin Hasan al-Shaibani (750-804 AD), 
Shafi’I (767-820 AD), Abu ‘Ubayd al-Qasim ibn Sallam (d. 838 AD), Ahmad bin Hanbal (780-855 AD), 
Qudamah bin Ja’far (d. 948 AD), Al-Mawardi (d. 1058 AD), Ibn Hazam (d. 1064 AD), Al-Sarakhsi (d. 
1090 AD), Nizam al-Mulk al-Tusi (1018-1093 AD), Al-Ghazali (1055-1111 AD), Al-Kasani (d. 1182 AD), 
Al-Shaizari (d. 1193 AD), Najmuddin al-Razi (d. 1256 AD), Nasiruddin Tusi (1201-1274 AD), Ibn 
Taimiyyah (1263-1328 AD), Ibn Al-Ukhuwwah (d. 1329 AD), Ibn al-Qayyim (1292-1350 AD), Abu Ishaq 
al-Shatibi (d. 1388 AD), Ibn Khaldun (1332-1404 AD), Al-Maqrizi (1364-1441 AD), Shah Waliullah 
(1703-1762 AD), and Muhammad Iqbal (1873-1938 AD) from “Recent Works on History of Economic 
Thought in Islam: A Survey,” http://islamic-world.net (accessed September 30, 2008). 
64 See, for example, Sheikh Mahmud Ahmad, M. Umer Chapra, Mohamed Aslam Haneef, Monzer 
Kahf, Mohsin S.Khan, Muhammad Mannan, Sayyid Naqvi, Muhammad Baqir Sadr, Haroon Khan 
Sherwani, Mohammad Nejatullah Siddiqi (whose survey of contemporary Islamic thought of the twentieth 
century is covered in Muslim Economic Thinking, Leicester, U.K.: Islamic Foundation, 1981), and Sayyid 
Talehani. 
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institutions,65 “there is little debate concerning the fact that Islam does legislate for 
economic activities, however, there is virtually no consensus or knowledge as to the 
logic, intellectual impetus, or operational bases of an all-encompassing Islamic body of 
economic thought,”66 or “that denominational differences between Sunni and Shi’a 
writers have little relevance in Islamic economics.”67  This provides a daunting challenge 
to extract principles which form Islamic global economics. 
1. Distinctive Characteristics of Islamic Economic Thinking 
Although an all-encompassing Islamic body of economic thought may not exist, 
there is consensus on its distinctive characteristics.  Universal in Islam, whether in 
politics or economics, is its endorsement of economic equality as well as its “quest for 
justice and promotion of social justice above wealth as a necessary condition for 
prosperity.”68  The prohibition of interest (riba) is the most oft cited characteristic of 
Islamic economics which aim to promote social justice above all.69   
The literature rejects a common view that “an Islamic economy is a static 
structure consisting of fixed norms with outdated redistribution and financial systems 
equipped with an unchanging set of instruments,” for one that “recognizes opportunities 
that generate pressure for institutional adaptation by asserting the holy laws of Islam 
                                                 
65 See, for example, Association of Muslim Social Scientists, U.S.A. (established in 1972), The 
Islamic Foundation, Leicester, U.K. (1973), Islamic Economics Research Bureau, Dhaka, Bangladesh 
(1976), the Center for Research in Islamic Economics, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (1977), the International 
Institute of Islamic Thought, Herndon, Virginia (1981), the Islamic Research and Training Institute of the 
Islamic Development Bank (1983), the International Institute of Islamic Economics, Islamabad, Pakistan 
(1983), the College of Economics, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (1983), and the International Association of 
Islamic Economics (1984), from Mohammad Umar Chapra, “What is Islamic Economics?” Islamic 
Development Bank, Prize Winners’ Lecture Series, No. 9, (2001): 45-46. 
66 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Islamic Economics: Novel Perspectives,” Middle Eastern Studies 25, No. 
4, (October 1989): 517. 
67 Rodney Wilson, “The Contributions of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr to Contemporary Islamic 
Economic Thought,” Journal of Islamic Studies 9, No. 1, (1998): 57. 
68 “Recent Works on History of Economic Thought in Islam: A Survey,” Islamic Economics, 
http://islamic-world.net/economics (accessed September 30, 2008). 
69 See, for example, Imtiaz A. Pervez, “Islamic Finance,” Arab Law Quarterly 5, No. 4, (November 
1990), John R. Presley and John G. Sessions, “Islamic Economics: The Emergence of a New Paradigm,” 
The Economic Journal 104, No. 424, (May 1994), S. Ramachandran, “Banking Regulations and Finance,”  
Economic Political Weekly 24, No. 51/52, (December 23-30, 1989), and Delwin A. Roy, “Islamic 
Banking,” Middle Eastern Studies 27, No. 3, (July 1991). 
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accommodate all the necessary flexibility for change.”70  Ahmad bin Hanbal also shares 
this view by encouraging jurists, “to adopt a fore more flexible and realistic stance on 
changing economic issues.”71   The injunctions and norms of Islamic law which “prevent 
injustice in the acquisition, management and disposal of resources,” also promote “trade, 
business and enterprise but at the same time is inimical to self-interest and undue 
profiteering.”72  While the later may of secondary interest to the promotion of equality, 
“Islam does favor growth and development.”73   
To attain sustainment growth and development while maintaining high standards 
of social justice requires the continuous execution of seemingly incompatible economic 
drivers.  While Islam favors growth, appeals to limit consumption and increase savings 
persist.  These economic inhibitors are overcome through three other principles of 
Islamic economics.  First, the Qur’an institutionalized social justice “through decrees that 
required the payment of an alms tax (zakat) and a voluntary charity for the poor:”74 
…all Muslims share equally in their obligation to worship God, so they all 
are duty bound to attend to the social welfare of their community by 
redressing economic inequalities through payment of an alms tax.  All 
adult Muslims who are able to do so are obliged to pay annually…usually 
2 ½ percent of their accumulated wealth and assets.75 
As savings increase, religious institutions take a greater amount of money through 
zakat; likewise, as the zakat is redistributed to the poor, it is spent back in the economy.  
The moral dimension of the zakat allows “Muslims to pay in recognition of their social 
 
                                                 
70 Timur Kuran, “Islamic Economics and the Islamic Subeconomy,” The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 9, No. 4, (Autumn, 1995), 160. 
71 Ahmad bin Hanbal, “Recent Works on History of Economic Thought in Islam: A Survey,” Islamic 
Economics, http://islamic-world.net/economics (accessed September 28, 2008). 
72 Imtiaz A. Pervez, “Islamic Finance,” Arab Law Quarterly 5, No. 4, (November 1990): 260. 
73 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Towards a Philosophy of Islamic Economics,” Hamdard Islamicus 12, No. 
4, (1989), http://www.financeinislam.com (accessed October 1, 2008). 
74 John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, 30. 
75 John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, 30. 
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responsibilities by fostering good behavior among the more prosperous.”76  Secondly, 
despite calls for an increase in savings, Islamic economics rejects “the hoarding of wealth 
to the exclusion of its subordination to higher ends:”77   
And do not make your hand as tied to your neck, by refusing to spend, or 
extend it completely, by being extravagant, and thereby become blamed 
and insolvent.78 
This brings the third principle into play – investment.  As the remainder is 
invested, “then economic development takes place with purity as Muslims will not invest 
in any project which is undesirable to Allah.”79  These projects may take place in the 
global economy as long as they contribute to improving overall social justice, promote 
economic equality and are considered desirable to Allah.  The final stipulation, however, 
is left open to interpretation, through the process of ijtihad, by the ulama.   
C. INTEGRATION OF ISLAMIC ECONOMICS 
Integration of economic activity into the world market is a necessary condition to 
foster the process of globalization and the economic incentives that follow.  Both actual 
economic flows, primarily through trade, foreign direct investment and portfolio 
investment, and the restrictions of those flows, through import barriers, tariffs and taxes, 
constitute the level of integration.  Islamic economic thought seeks to answer just how 
integrated an Islamic state, whose main responsibility is to promote social justice, can 
become with the global economy if either these economic flows are encouraged or 
limited.  Only when the goals of economic policy are in line with the objectives of the 
Shari’a does the state create conditions “favorable to the organization of an active 
economic society.”80 
                                                 
76 Al-Sadr as paraphrased by Rodney Wilson in “The Contributions of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr to 
Contemporary Islamic Economic Thought,” Journal of Islamic Studies 9, No. 1, (1998): 49. 
77 John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, 30. 
78 Seheeh International, ed., The Qur’an: English Meanings, (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Al-Muntada al-
Islami, 2004), 17:29. 
79 Muhammad Arif, “Toward a Definition of Islamic Economics: Some Scientific Considerations,” 
Journal of Research in Islamic Economics 2, No. 2 (Winter, 1985): 85. 
80 Ibn Taimiyyah, “Recent Works on History of Economic Thought in Islam: A Survey,” Islamic 
Economics, http://islamic-world.net/economics (accessed September 28, 2008). 
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While Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr holds the state accountable to promote social 
justice by satisfying human needs, “a considerable scope is given for individual freedom 
within a framework of Islamic norms, goals and values for the private sector.”81  This 
runs contrary to a competing hypothesis which suggests “economic incentives shape the 
structure of Islamic economics more so than religious norms.”82  The following survey of 
the integration of Islamic economics most certainly agrees with al-Sadr. 
1. Actual Economic Flows 
The indicators of globalization which point to actual economic flows include 
trade, foreign direct investment and portfolio investment.83  Trade is the exchange of 
goods and services between two parties, a practice al-Sadr promoted for he saw that the 
process of exchange created value.84  Foreign direct investment (FDI) is “the flow of 
funding provided by an investor or lender to establish or acquire a foreign company or 
finance an existing foreign company that the investor owns and controls.”85  Due to the 
prohibition of riba, profits from FDI cannot be made through the charging of interest.  
Two FDI schemes supported by Islamic economics include profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) 
and the mark-up principle.  Portfolio investment, which is more of an instrument of 
modern finance, is a short-term investment in assets of developing countries, such as 
stocks, bonds or other securities.86  Classical Islamic thinkers and modern theorists alike 
find room in Islamic thought to explicate these indicators. 
                                                 
81 Al-Sadr as paraphrased by Rodney Wilson in “The Contributions of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr to 
Contemporary Islamic Economic Thought,” Journal of Islamic Studies 9, No. 1, (1998): 56. 
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Contemporary Islamic Economic Thought,” Journal of Islamic Studies 9, No. 1, (1998): 51. 
85 Thomas A. Pugel, International Economics, Thirteenth Edition, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007), 
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a. Trade 
Economic analysis on the effects of trade, especially free trade, 
emphasizes the whole world benefits received from international trade.87  The Qur’an 
and Hadith elucidate the value of trade.  These themes resonate in the works of Islamic 
economic thinkers from Ibn Khaldun to Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr as both appreciated the 
benefits of trade as they spoke favorably about cooperation between people of different 
societies.  Ibn Khaldun understood the principle of comparative advantage, especially as 
related to the division of labor, to justify the “terms of exchange between rich and poor 
countries and of the prosperity to import and export:”88    
…what is obtained through the co-operation of a group of human beings 
satisfies the need of a number many times greater (than themselves). For 
instance, no one, by himself, can obtain the share of the wheat he needs 
for food. But when six or ten persons, including a smith and a carpenter to 
make the tools, and others who are in charge of the oxen, the plowing of 
the soil, the harvesting of the ripe grain, and all the other agricultural 
activities, undertake to obtain their food and work toward that purpose 
either separately or collectively and thus obtain through their labor a 
certain amount of food, (that amount) will be food for a number of people 
many times their own. The combined labor produces more than the needs 
and necessities of the workers.89 
Although al-Sadr did not specifically address the merits of international 
trade, he did emphasize cooperation.  He recognized, “the complexity of life, arising from 
his relationship with the environment, made it difficult for him to cope adequately with 
his needs,” therefore, “cooperation with others made the effort to satisfy he needs 
manageable.”90  The Qur’an also stipulates the obligation of other Muslims to provide 
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assistance for those unable to engage in trade through no fault of their own.91  Taken a 
step further, if the resources of one’s environment cannot adequately provide for man and 
by extension, his society, or man is unable to provide for himself, then through assistance 
or collaboration can he acquire those resources, perhaps trade in a global area is 
permissible. 
Global Islamic economic thought recognizes trade as an efficient method 
to make a profit.  As an early proponent of the free market, Ibn Khaldun valued profit-
making commerce to coincide with the forces of supply and demand, even if domestic 
markets could no longer support the production supply:   
It should be known that commerce means the attempt to make a profit by 
increasing capital, through buying goods at a low price and selling them at 
a high price, whether these goods consist of slaves, grain, animals, 
weapons, or clothing material. The accrued (amount) is called "profit" 
(ribh).  The attempt to make such a profit may be undertaken by storing 
goods and holding them until the market has fluctuated from low prices to 
high prices. This will bring a large profit. Or, the merchant may transport 
his goods to another country where they are more in demand than in his 
own, where he bought them. This, (again,) will bring a large profit.92 
These concepts were not lost on Ibn Taimiyyah as well, for he “had a clear 
notion of prices in a free market being determined by demand and supply.”93 
As trade and commercial activity expands in a prosperous economy, so 
does the requirement for trade contract enforcement in order to sustain fairness and social 
justice.  While Qur’an is very specific on the regulations of written contracts regarding 
business transactions and the payment of debts: 
…when you contract a debt for a specified term, write it down.  And let a 
scribe write down for you in justice.  Let no scribe refuse to write as Allah 
has taught him.  So let him write and let the one who has the obligation 
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dictate. And let him fear Allah, his Lord, and not leave anything out of it.  
But if the one who has the obligation is of limited understanding or weak 
or unable to dictate himself, then let his guardian dictate in justice.  And 
bring two witnesses…so that if one of them errs, the other can provide 
reminder.  And do not be too weary to write it, whether it is small or large, 
for all its specified term.  That is more just in the sight of Allah and 
stronger as evidence and more likely to prevent doubt between you, except 
when it is an immediate transaction which you conduct among yourselves.  
For then there is not blame upon you if you do not write it.  And take 
witnesses when you conclude a contract…94 
There is some room for interpretation in the Shari’a on the sale of 
commodities not yet available for delivery in the market – or futures.  Abu Hanifa’s 
solution to allow these transaction to occur required all contracts to be made in writing to 
exactly specify “what must be known and stated clearly in the contract to include the 
commodity, its kind, quality and quantity, and the date and place of delivery,”95 in order 
to prevent disputes on both sides.  Although, these practices to not restrict international 
business transaction, it does reflect the importance of detailed, written contracts in 
today’s global marketplace. 
b. Foreign Direct Investment 
As an instrument of modern global economics there is no specific 
reference to foreign direct investment in early Islamic economic thought, however, 
investment by a party through either profit-and-loss (PLS) sharing or via the mark-up 
principle form the basis of FDI justification.  Classical thinkers such as al-Awza and al-
Shaibani realized the potential value of this type of investment through preferences in 
financing in order to raise capital to increase growth and prosperity, therefore improving 
social justice.96 
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Islamic economics justifies the profit-and-loss principle through 
distributive risk acceptance, thus easing the burden across all parties equally and justly.  
There are two instruments based on this principle: 
Mudarabah:  banks provide capital and entrepreneurs contribute effort and 
exercises complete control over the business venture.  In case of a loss, the 
bank earns no return or a negative return on its investment and the 
entrepreneur receives no compensation for her effort. In case of a gain, 
returns are split according to a negotiated equity percentage. 
Musharaka:  the entrepreneur and the bank jointly supply the capital and 
manage the project. Losses are borne in proportion to the contribution of 
capital while profit proportions are negotiated freely.97 
Al-Kasani recognized, under mudarabah, “profits on capital devolve on its 
exposure to risk and uncertainty, clearly making the supplier of capital liable to losses.”98 
Engrained in the fabric of Islamic economics is the more traditional mark-
up principle which allows for investment though the negotiation of an agreed upon profit 
margin.  Like with PLS, there are two widely used instruments: 
Murabaha:  the bank purchases an asset on behalf of an entrepreneur, then 
resells the asset to the entrepreneur at a predetermined price that covers 
the original cost and an added, negotiated profit margin. Payment is made 
in the future in lump sum or in installments. Ownership resides with the 
bank until all payments are made. Murabaha is the classic instrument for 
trade financing, dating to ninth-century Arabia. 
Ijara:  the bank purchases the asset and allows the entrepreneur to use it 
for a fixed charge. The ownership of the asset either remains with the bank 
or is gradually transferred to the entrepreneur in a rent-to-own contract.  
Ijara financing is the traditional contract for what is known as leasing 
today.99 
                                                 
97 Rajesh K. Aggarwal and Tarik Yousef, “Islamic Banks and Investment Financing,” Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking 32, No. 1, (February 2000): 96. 
98 Al-Kasani, “Recent Works on History of Economic Thought in Islam: A Survey,” Islamic 
Economics, http://islamic-world.net/economics (accessed September 28, 2008). 
99 Rajesh K. Aggarwal and Tarik Yousef, “Islamic Banks and Investment Financing,” Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking 32, No. 1, (February 2000): 96. 
 28
Under both PLS and the mark-up principle, investors can either acquire or 
finance an existing foreign company within the ethical limits of Islamic economics.  The 
limits of these two investment schemes do not inhibit participation in the global 
economy. 
c. Portfolio Investment 
As an instrument of modern finance, there is no specific Islamic economic 
thought detailing the permissibility of portfolio investment, however, unlike FDI, 
portfolio investment does not require the investor to take an active role in the 
management of these assets.  Thus portfolio investment runs into conflict with the 
principle of Islamic economics that requires active participation in all business 
enterprises. 
2. Government Regulation in Trade and Capital Restrictions 
The economic aspect of a religion which provides structure and direction for all 
ways of life not only includes guidance for what must be done (wjib), but also on what is 
prohibited (haram).  Although government regulation remains a part of Islamic 
economics, the degree of such regulation remains at the forefront of the debate.  State 
inference in market operations is not prohibited although such actions can restrict trade 
and capital flows to the point where it not only affects economic integration, but also 
growth and development.  While “economic responsibilities of the rulers have been a 
recurrent theme of Islamic economic thought since the earliest days,” central to the state’s 
foremost duty is “the elimination of oppression and establishment of justice in ensuring 
the welfare it the people.”100  Muhammad Siddiqi summarizes the role of the state into 
four types of action: 
(1) Ensuring compliance with the Islamic Code of conduct by individuals 
through education and, whenever necessary, through coercion; 
(2) Maintaining health conditions in the market to ensure its proper 
functioning; 
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(3) Modifying the allocation of resources and distribution of income 
affected by the market mechanism by guiding and regulating it as well as 
by direct intervention and participation in the process. 
(4) Taking positive steps in the field of production and capital formation to 
accelerate growth and ensure social justice.101 
While al-Sadr did not rule out government intervention, it should be relegated to 
“encouraging and developing individual virtue and moral behavior.”102  As such, for an 
Islamic economic system to be the most capable of not only solving the contradictions of 
both socialist or capitalist orders, it must also be “more able to satisfy human needs as 
well as have the capacity to develop and progress in accordance with human 
potentials.”103  
The teachings of Abdul ‘Abbas Ahmad ibn Taimiyyah provide insight into the 
role of state interference in economic life based on “ensuring that every individual’s basic 
needs are fulfilled.”104  In this regard, he believed the state has a three-fold responsibility 
in enforcing the Islamic code of conduct:  
…to ensure producers, traders, and other economic agents adhere to 
honest and fair dealings; 2) to keep the market free of coercion and 
exploitation of the weak and needy; and 3) that the market functions on 
the basis of fair competition between equals.105 
This keeps the state in a position to only coordinate activities between economic 
actors, not necessarily dictating the regulations in which these activities take place, or as 
Haroon Khan Sherwani classifies, “a middle path in contrast with the extreme positions 
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taken in modern times by capitalism and socialism.”106  The state utilizes various 
components of government regulation in trade and capital restrictions to exert their 
influence over economic flows. 
a. Import Barriers 
Import barriers are limits on the total quantity of imports of a specific 
product allowed into a country during a specified period of time.107  Various import 
barriers include quotas, export restraints, government procurement, local content, product 
standards, advanced deposits, licensing and other customs procedures.108  A proponent of 
early protectionism by placing restriction on imports included Ibn al-Ukhuwwah who 
advocated these regulating practices in order to protect the public interest.109 
b. Tariffs 
A tariff is a tax on importing goods or services into a country through the 
process of international trade.110  A form of tariff is the fixing of prices as they enter the 
country.  Abu Yusuf considers tampering with prices outside of the forces of the market 
to run counter to the principles of Islamic economics, citing “the prevailing thought to 
free the market of hoarding, monopoly, and other corrupt practices and leave the 
determination of prices to the forces of supply and demand.”111 
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c. Taxes on International Trade 
Taxes on international trade differ from tariffs in that they levy taxes on 
business transactions and trade in the international arena.  While the imposition of taxes 
fall within the principles of Islamic economics, classical thinkers noted “the evil 
consequences of oppression and extortions by tax officers against the intentions of 
Allah,”112 while others “opposed all taxes not explicitly prescribed in the Shari’a.”113 
d. Capital Account Restrictions 
Capital accounts are the net flows, as functions of foreigners increasing 
holding over domestic assets relative to domestic holdings of foreign assets, as a part of a 
country’s balance of payments.114  Government imposed regulations on these flows 
comprise capital account restrictions.  While not specifically placing restrictions on 
capital accounts, al-Sharaksi opposes either government of private selling of land, as he 
believes it rightfully belongs to the Islamic state.115  If taken literally, this would take 
away all land held by foreigners from the domestic capital account.  Ibn Hazm takes this 
notion one step further stating landowners to not have the right to offer their land 
available for investment as only the owner should be allowed to cultivate his land.116  
D.  ISLAM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Islamic thought on development must take the public interest into consideration 
on all economic endeavors.  While these activities seek growth and development, they 
must not forsake its primary responsibility of improving social justice, reducing 
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unemployment and curbing inflation.  Factors leading to economic decline, such as 
corruption and oppression must also be avoided,117 as they only serve to uphold 
“economic backwardness and hinder the fulfillment of (a state’s) Islamic role in the 
world.”118  While economic growth is a positive indicator which drives development, the 
negative effects of unemployment and inflation can work to reverse its effects.  Islamic 
economic thought reflects on these components of development. 
1. Growth and Development 
The foundations for Islamic economic thought promotes growth and development, 
“for a true Muslim looks upon developmental efforts as striving in the cause of Allah,”119 
but not at the expense of social justice.  This presents a possible dilemma as continued 
economic growth through the means of savings, investments and capital formation 
safeguards the maintenance of social justice.120  To perpetuate this cycle, Islamic 
economists call for a Keynesian-style “supply-pushed system while at the same time 
reject a demand-pulled” approach.121  Growth based on an increased consumer spending 
cannot be sustained due to Islam’s “depreciation of excess, wariness of consumption” and 
materialism.122  Although, some economists do not think such a condition could severely 
prohibit demand, “it will sufficiently restrict expansion of the demand function as to 
hamper the contribution of that function to economic growth.”123 
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Shah Waliullah, however, did identify the causes of economic decline within an 
Islamic system.  These include the concentration of wealth, conspicuous consumption by 
the rich, emergence of a class of have-nots, and the increasing burden of taxes on the 
common man,”124 all of which are present in Iran’s modern day economy.  Classical 
Islamic economic thinkers identified the causes of economic decline for an Islamic 
system over two-hundred years before the Islamic Revolution of 1979.   
2. Unemployment 
Chronic unemployment leading to poverty is one of the major inhibitors of 
economic development.  Although the goal of economic prosperity benefits a virtuous 
society, the individual may be left without a job.  Therefore it is up to the community to 
ensure work is available to all those who can perform it.  Since interest is prohibited, “all 
earning is exclusively linked to working.”125  Al-Sadr also held the protection of labor in 
high regdar, “for if work is penalized, this means a death blow to the most important 
power that pushes the economic system ahead.”126   According to al-Sadr, “poverty and 
deprivation can be eliminated through the presence of a mutually beneficial morally 
defined framework of human relationships between the rich and the poor.”127 
3.  Inflation 
Inflation is the rise in the national price levels as the relationship between the 
money supply and demand changes.128  As a student of Ibn Khaldun, al-Maqrizi 
identified several factors that contribute to inflation, namely “corruption and bad 
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administration, heavy burden of taxes, and increases in the supply of money.”129  Based 
on his teachings, a foreign exchange system based on gold and silver could be the only 
true determinant of value,130 realizing the benefits of the Bretton Woods System five 
hundred years for its time. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The paradigm of Islamic economics seeks to rectify the extremes of capitalism 
and socialism, individualism and egalitarianism, into an Islamic system that promotes 
social justice as the necessary condition for prosperity while striving for growth and 
development for the betterment of its people.  As such, the ethics of Islamic economics 
prohibits excesses on free market economic activity – whether consumption, savings, or 
debt – as these inevitably promote unfairness and inequality prompting interference from 
the state.  The basic principles of Islamic economics follow these same ethical lines 
through the encouragement of trade and enterprise while at the same time restricting self-
interest and undue profiteering.  This provides the justification for the state to build a 
relationship between the individual and community through cooperation and access to the 
opportunities available within the global economy. 
While the state has a role in the promotion of social justice, Islamic economic 
thought permits a wide-range of economic activities that adhere to a code of conduct 
prescribed under the Shari’a.  Though concerned for the weak and the needy, 
encouraging, promoting and expanding trade opportunities are understood as conditions 
for improving the welfare of all economic agents – even those who participate in the 
global economy.  The benefits of globalization found in Islamic economic thought 
include the encouragement of cooperation through trade, understanding of comparative 
advantage, protection of free markets, creation of financial markets, support for profit-
seeking ventures and diverse investment opportunities.   
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Classical Islamic economic thinkers such as Ibn Khaldun understood the potential 
positive impact of globalization due to his “keenness to take into consideration the 
various geographical, ethnic, political, and sociological forces,”131 that contribute to 
various economic situations and to counter the inevitable problems which would arise.  
Other purveyors of Islamic economics did not dismiss the validity of these factors as well 
in applying them to the challenges brought by trying to maintain the virtues of provided 
social justice. Since participating in the world’s global economy increases the prospect 
for furthering social justice, it falls within the capacity of approval within Islamic 
economics. 
With the foundations of Islamic economic thought on globalization set, a 
historical narrative of the ulama’s economic activism to the evolution of a post-
revolutionary global political economy will be examined. 
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III. FROM A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ACTIVISM TO THE 
EVOLUTION OF A POST REVOLUTIONARY GLOBAL 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 
The ulama demonstrate their entrenchment in the state as the instruments of 
political economic power.  Despite the allowances of Islamic economics for the processes 
of globalization, the ulama remain firmly entrenched in keeping outside influence from 
interceding on their grip of power over the instruments of Iran’s political economy.  
Iran’s history showcases the evolution of this power structure tied to both social and 
economic changes that have reduced the power of certain social classes at the same time 
increased the power of others,132 despite factions among them, keeping the ulama at the 
highest levels of control.   
To illustrate the socioeconomic activism of the ulama, Iran’s history from the end 
of the Qajar Dynasty through the Pahlavi Dynasty leading up to the Islamic Revolution of 
1979 is examined.  The ulama were seen as the active leaders of the Tobacco Protest of 
1891-1892, championing both sides of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911, the 
nationalization of oil under Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq leading to the 1953 
coup d’état,  spearheading violent protests against the Shah’s land reform bills in 1963, 
and finally as the leading organizers of the 1979 Islamic Revolution resulting in the 
ascendancy of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as the Supreme Leader under the 
guardianship of the jurist (velayat-e faqih).  Prior to the Revolution, the ulama worked 
from outside the government to affect economic policy outcomes in their favor. 
The post revolutionary period further demonstrates the ulama’s hold over Iran’s 
economic policy.  While the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s had a significant destabilizing 
impact on the economy, three distinct Five Year Plans did little to integrate Iran in the 
global economy.  The second half of this chapter follows the radical beginnings of a post 
revolutionary economy to the rise of the pragmatists from 1989-1996, the reform 
movements of 1997-2005 to a return of the hardliners after the 2005 presidential election. 
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A. A HISTORY OF ECONOMICALLY BASED POLITICAL ACTIVISM 
While Iran had no direct colonial experiences, both dynasties of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries endured Anglo and American influences.  Through the 
mismanagement of state affairs, Iran suffered from high debt under the Qajar monarchy 
and allowed British influence in both agriculture and oil industries – a source of tension 
with the merchant class and the ulama.  Their resentment of the Qajar’s policies lead to 
the Iranian Constitutional Revolution with the creation of the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) 
in 1906, and the rise of Reza Khan Pahlavi, who eventually over threw the Qajar 
monarchy and installed himself as Shah in 1925.  His reign lasted until his ousting in 
1941, when his son Mohammed Reza Pahlavi became Shah of Iran.  Common within the 
state of Iran, the new government sought to “transform Iran’s economy to a semi-
industrialized and commercialized system (in a global context) while aiming to expand 
the power of the central government over all segments of society” with the explicit 
purpose of “eliminating the traditional social forces and ideologies such as the ulama and 
religion” and replacing them with “new ideologies seen more compatible with modernist 
aims.” 133 
The history of economically based political activism on the part of the ulama 
began with the Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892.  In this case religious leaders used their 
position in society as sources of emulation against the Shi’a of Iran to force the monarchy 
to alter its economic policy away from previously granted foreign government 
concessions.  During the Constitutional Revolution the ulama argued for greater political 
representation through the creation of a new parliament.  This legislative body – to which 
the ulama could be directly elected into – now had the ability to draft and pass laws 
directly affecting the future of Iran’s political economy.    Again, during the process to 
nationalize Iran’s oil industry and later during attempts at land form, the ulama advocated 
policies that provided what they perceived to have the most beneficial economic 
outcomes for themselves as well as their constituents. 
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1. The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892 
The origins of the Tobacco Protest trace back to March 1890, when the Iranian 
monarch Nasir al-Din Shah gave control of Iran’s indigenous production, sale and 
exportation of tobacco over to a British company, effectively giving a foreign power 
monopoly over a domestic industry.  A popular resistance movement provoked by the 
merchant class and lead by the ulama, “the situation rapidly transformed into a movement 
of protest against internal corruption and misgovernment on the one hand, and foreign 
influence on the other.”134  What started as an economic disruption to the merchant and 
bazaar classes evolved into a fight against Islam as perpetuated by some of the religious 
leaders.  From their point of view, “with the Shah unable to defend the nation, ayatollahs 
stepped into the breach to defend national rights and interests,”135 however, not all the 
ulama stood united against the concessions on tobacco given to the British. 
In early 1891, Ayatollah Mirza Hasan Shirazi, the sole source of emulation 
(Marja’ Taqlid) in Karbala, sent an initial telegram to the Shah initially condemning the 
tobacco concessions: 
…permitting foreigners to interfere in the internal affairs of the country, 
their intermingling and closeness with the Muslim people, and the act of 
the banking, tobacco, and railroad concession and so forth are contrary to 
the Quran and Godly principles, weaken the independence of the state and 
the order of the country and deteriorate the condition of the people.136 
The words of the ayatollah did not deter the Shah or put and end to the issue. 
Despite this proclamation by a powerful member of the ulama, many religious 
leaders either aligned with the Shah politically or directly affected by the concessions 
economically through land holdings moved against the protest.  The ulama in Tehran, for 
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example, “believed boycotting tobacco was the elimination of an evil by a worse evil,”137 
which caused a few of them to lift the boycott.  The Shah also sought the assistance of 
Ayatollah Haj Mirza Javad, an influential mujtahid in Tabriz to convince other leading 
ulama to ease the boycott.  In response, tobacco merchants in Mashhad looked to the 
ulama for support, but only found it in a few, namely Va-ez Sabzivari, Mirza 
Abdorrahman, and Sayyid Mohammad Kalati, while the tobacco company gained the 
support of Mirza Ahmad Razavi, Haj Shaykh Mohammad Taqi and Sayyid Habibullah.138  
In December 1891, Shirazi resorted to the power and influence his position 
granted him and issued a fatwa banning the use of tobacco among his followers stating: 
In the name of God, the Merciful and the Forgiving.  As of now, the 
consumption of tobacco and tootoon in any form is tantamount to war 
against the Imam of the Age.139 
This fatwa instigated a nationwide boycott, reaching not only outside the palace 
walls with huge demonstrations, but also inside, “when the Shah’s servants refused to fill 
his waterpipe.”140  By the end of January 1892, despite a deeply divided ulama, the Shah 
reversed the concessions. 
2. The Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911 
The political involvement of the ulama over global economic interests in the 
Tobacco Protest served “as a preamble to a more significant revolt that came about 
fourteen years later,”141 when they joined in the Constitutional Revolution.  Like the 
previous movement, “the ulama could not maintain their unity as politically diverse 
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factions emerged in their ranks,”142 and split among constitutionalists, those who 
advocated a check on the monarch’s powers, and anti-constitutionalists, who sought to 
defend the Shari’a in the wake of the Western ideal of constitutionalism and 
republicanism.  
Even among the constitutionalists where the movement represented an alliance of 
influential urban groups including the Shi’a clergy, the business community and the 
secular intelligentsia,”143 division within the ulama existed.  Members of the ulama 
permeated each of the five influential organizations playing significant roles in the 
revolution: the Secret Society; the Secret Center; the Social Democratic Party; the 
Society of Humanity; and the Revolutionary Committee; with “The Secret Society, 
(considered) the most important of the these organizations,” formed in Tehran in early 
1905 by members of the ulama.144  The Secret Society established its legitimacy, 
credibility and institutional authority by maintaining “contact with the leading ulama in 
Karbala and Najaf, as well as with Ayatollah Abdullah Rehbehani and Ayatollah 
Muhammad Tabatabai, two of the three important mujtahids living in Tehran.”145 
During the Constitutional Revolution the constitutionalist ulama looked to Najaf 
for institutional authority, namely the writing of the preeminent Shi’a leader, Ayatollah 
Mirza Na’ini.  His advocacy of constitutionalism argued: 
…in the absence of the twelfth imam an Islamic government could not be 
constructed...the government of Islam is the government of God on earth, 
and it is incumbent on every Muslim to follow its orders.  Precisely for 
this reason, however, Islamic government requires the infallible wisdom 
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the name of God.  While the world awaits the return of the twelfth Imam 
the form of governance most compatible with Shi’ism is democracy 
shaped and defined by a popularly ratified constitution.146 
Fundamentally, the Revolution could move forward as long as it kept intact the tenants of 
Islam.  
The ulama in direct opposition of the Revolution disagreed.  Leading the anti-
constitutionalist faction stood Ayatollah Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri, “a strict traditionalist 
and a champion of an absolutist fundamentalism based solely on Islamic Shari’a.”147  He 
argued: 
…the drafting of a constitution involves three innovations, all of which are 
against Islam and are forbidden: (i) writing law apart from the Islamic law; 
(ii) forcing subjects to obey a law which is not present in the sharia; (iii) 
punishing subjects for their failure to obey the written law.148 
With his argument, Nouri gained a following among some of the ulama while 
advocating the same position held by Mohammad Ali Shah as they both opposed 
constitutionalism. 
Na’ini did not let Nouri’s response go unchecked.  He provided an Islamic 
justification in his reply:  
Once these three points are clear, there remains no room to doubt the 
necessity of changing a despotic regime into a constitutional one. This is 
true, because the former consists of three sets of usurpations and 
oppressions: 1) It is usurpation of the authority of God and injustice to 
Him; 2) it is usurpation of the Imam's authority and oppression of the 
Imam; 3) it also involves oppression of the people. By contrast, a 
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authority is usurped. Thus, a constitutional regime limits three sets of 
oppressions to one; consequently it is necessary to adopt it (the 
constitution).149 
The Constitutional Revolution showcases that the ulama, “with (their) intense 
ideological issues between two politically divergent factions,”150 were not monolithic in 
their positions.  Although internal disagreement amongst the ulama would continue 
throughout the course of significant events in Iran’s history, a more unified front would 
begin to emerge. 
3. Oil Nationalization and the 1953 Coup D’état 
Following the ratification of Iran’s Constitution and the implementation of 
parliamentary authority, a growing sentiment in the Majlis, that included members of the 
religious establishment, spearheaded by now Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, 
expressed a “desire to transfer political power from the royal court to the parliament, and 
a desire to increase Iran’s control over its oil industry.”151  The nationalization of the 
British owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by a bill introduced by Mosaddeq and passed 
by the Majlis again brought the ulama out from the seminaries and mosques to the 
forefront of political economic debates. 
During a conference of the ulama in Qom in 1949, the recognized sole source of 
emulation, Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Boroujerdi, attempted “to prevent the ulama 
from taking part in politics (by) adopting a firm non-interventionist position prohibiting 
all the ulama from joining parties trafficking in politics.”152  In effect Boroujerdi 
reinforced the power of the Shah by maintaining the status quo, keeping the ulama  
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politically sidelined.  Concern over the Grand Ayatollah’s position came from Ayatollahs 
Morteza Khademi, Sayyid Mohammad Yazdi, Ruhullah Khomeini, and Mohammad Reza 
Musavi Golpayegani.153 
Despite the attempts by Boroujerdi to limit the ulama’s role in politics, the issue 
of oil nationalization brought the ulama to the political forefront as, “while many in the 
Shi’a ulama supported Mosaddeq’s goals, most senior clerics backed the restoration of 
the monarchy because they feared chaos and communism more.”154 A faction led by 
Ayatollahs Boroujerdi and Behbahani continued to support the Shah, while Mosaddeq 
received backing from Ayatollahs Abol-Ghasem Kashani, Mohammad Khvansari and Ali 
Akbar Burgha’i,155 although Kashani eventually broke from the ranks of the National 
Front and spoke out against Mosaddeq after the coup which removed the Prime Minister 
from power.  In the aftermath, the ulama retreated from the political vanguard as the 
Shah consolidated his powers in an authoritarian regime with strong anti-clerical policies, 
where “no united opposition on the part of the ulama against the Pahlavi state developed 
until the land reforms in the late fifties.”156 
4. Land Reform Bills of 1959-1963 
The land reform bills enacted by the Shah during 1959-1963 not only provided 
another opportunity for the ulama actively participate in an event with political and 
economic ramifications, but it also afforded a catalyst to finally unite the ulama – 
momentum gained during this period would carry on until the Islamic Revolution in 
1979.  While the social and economic changes – such as strengthening of the central 
government, build up of military forces and marginalization of the ulama – occurring 
during this period were similar to those created since the Pahlavis took power, when the 
government encroached into the ulama’s economic livelihood – their religious 
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endowment (waqf) – and imposed regulations on those lands did the ulama respond,157 as 
“this provided favorable conditions for the growth in ulama power in their opposition to 
the state.”158  The ulama’s response included organized protests and workers’ strikes 
designed to demonstrate to the state who exactly controlled the people. 
Although Grand Ayatollah Boroujerdi maintained a favorable relationship with 
the Shah, the land reform bill of 1959 changed the nature of that relationship, as the 
reforms “violated the law of Islam.”159  This declaration provided a basis to unify the 
ulama as “Shi’ism would take a leading role in the social and political struggles of the 
day,”160 and “perhaps for the first time in their history, the ulama unanimously turned 
against the state.”161  Ayatollahs Behbehani and Milani also spoke out against the Shah 
over the issues of land reform.  However, the ulama’s unity against the state was not 
without its own internal differences.  There was still a conservative element in the Qom 
establishment under Boroujerdi until his death in 1961, and a radical block under 
Ayatollah Khomeini which would keep this division between quietists and radicals in 
synchronization until the Islamic Revolution. 
5. Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979 
Until the Islamic Revolution the ulama did not stand united against the Shah’s 
despotism and corruption.  They viewed his economic, political and social reforms as 
tools which not only aimed to increase his central authority, but also to marginalize the 
influence of Iran’s religious leaders.  In these previous events, “the ulama’s failure to 
combine their efforts suggests that their opposition (to the state) was not aimed at radical 
change,” although the events which unfolded in 1978-1979, suggest “all opposition 
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forces worked together and cooperated, because their interests were parallel,”162 and the 
ulama, once again, became the focus of leading popular opposition to the state through 
established networks of mosques and connections with the merchant, bazaar and working 
classes of Iranian society.  Under the charismatic leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, 
conservative, quietist and radical elements came together against the state, as Iran was “to 
be led by the ulama whose knowledge of Islamic law, whose just conduct qualify them 
for leadership and whose position as such is sanctified by the Qur’an and Prophetic 
traditions.”163  
Only the Revolution against the Shah could keep the historically fractioned ulama 
together though, as afterwards, “not all Shi’a ulama were persuaded by Khomeini 
argument,” promoting the theory of Islamic government under the guardianship of the 
jurist (velayat-e faqih), and “no one among Khomeini’s peers was more vocal in his 
criticism than Grand Ayatollah Abol-Qasem al-Khoi, who saw no support in Shi’a 
theology or law for the velayat-e faqih.”164  Despite his objections and those of his taqlid, 
Khomeini’s vision of Islamic government was put into practice in Iran after the 
ratification of the new Constitution which contained articles pertaining to the rule of the 
jurist and set in motions the makings of a new political economy. 
B.  EVOLUTION OF A POST REVOLUTIONARY ECONOMY 
From the beginning of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini’s famous 
quote, “Economics is for donkeys,”165 best surmises his disdain for the fundamental 
understanding of the intricacies of economics.  This pervasive attitude toward economics 
resonated with the post-revolutionary leaders, constitutional architects, members of the 
religious establishment and future parliamentarians.  Branded as a western tool of 
subversion, economics had no place in the construct of an ideal Islamic state: 
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The revolution of 1979 reversed the Shah’s modernization and set in 
motion a process of Islamicization of Iranian society. Islamicization was 
meant to cleanse the country of decadent Western culture which had 
infected its body and soul.  To the revolutionaries who toppled him, the 
Shah was a symbol of this Western decadence and cultural imperialism.166  
However, throughout the rest of the world a new economic phenomenon called 
globalization began to take shape.  From 1972 to 1997 less developed countries saw 
increased trade and net capital flows as the direct result of democratic expansion.167  The 
ulama viewed globalization as a threat to their newly established social order which not 
only kept them at the top of society, but now placed them at the head of all governmental 
institutions.  Closing Iran’s borders, limiting foreign involvement and adopting new 
protective measures only served to increase their isolationism. Globalization presented a 
direct challenge to their sphere of influence is it would only “unravel elite cohesiveness 
as the degree of control over economic policymaking and performance becomes 
significantly constrained, and nations are con-fronted with higher levels of uncertainty, 
indeterminacy, and hence, social instability.”168 
1. A Radical Beginning from 1979-1988 
The framers of Iran’s radical beginning reflected upon a history which “instilled a 
deep trust of foreign investment.”169 Newly established bureaucratic institutions designed 
to not only keep the ulama at key positions of power though all levels of government, but 
also enabled them to determine the budding Islamic Republic’s economic agenda.  
Working in the government, the ulama were in a position to directly limit the influence of 
outside actors.  To the revolutionaries, “foreign powers were only interested in Iran’s 
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wealth,”170 and had no interest in developing that wealth in accordance with Islamic 
principles. The new government, under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, 
“institutionalized the role of the religious establishment to ensure that the state complied 
with Islamic precepts.”171    
The spending habits of the Shah, the intrusion of Western companies and their 
capitalist proclivities proved what could happen to the economy if left in the hands of 
those not familiar with the teachings of Islam.  His disdain for these polices echo from his 
words: 
Huge amounts of capital are being swallowed up; our public funds are 
being embezzled; our oil is being plundered; and our country is being 
turned into a market for expensive, unnecessary goods by the 
representatives of foreign companies, which make it possible for foreign 
capitalists and their local agents to pocket the people's money.172 
In 1979, the Revolutionary Committee for Economic Policy published a nine-
point program to guide the economy in post-revolutionary Iran.  The program stressed 
godliness over prosperity; minimum outputs of oil; involvement of religious education as 
a vital part of development; self-sufficiency in agriculture and industry; adjustment of 
development strategy to match spiritual needs and that all citizens should have equal 
claims on financial resources.173  This program followed Khomeini’s vision of Iran’s 
economy:  a self-sufficient state, free from foreign completion and markets, utilizing 
natural resources to provide for the social welfare of its people.  The processes leading 
towards any type of globalization are noticeably absent in this plan.   
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Instead, nationalization of private companies, controlled prices, import 
restrictions, government-sponsored subsides and opposition to foreign investment marked 
Iran’s new economic landscape.  Although initially dismissive of socialist tendencies, 
some in the ulama joined in the leftist debates in envisioning a radical new economic 
system that was neither capitalist nor socialist.  Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleqani defended 
his shared worldview of a new Iran where “Islam was just as progressive and 
revolutionary as Marxism.”174  In comparing the two systems: 
…the ideas of absolute, free ownership (capitalism) and its rival, the 
absolute negation of private ownership (collectivism and socialism), are 
the special products of the century of abrupt industrial development…free 
ownership causes subjugation, emergence of privileged capitalists, and the 
deprivation of workers…the negation of private ownership limits 
individual freedom and, in turn requires the dictatorship of a special 
class.175 
The constitution of the new Islamic Republic reflects these ideas.  
Khomeini’s constitutional architects included articles concerning the economy 
and financial affairs which emphasize economic independence, the role state, cooperative 
and private sectors all within the guidelines of Islamic law.  Article 43 specifies nine 
criteria the Iranian economy must achieve: 
1. The provision of basic necessities for all citizens: housing, food, 
clothing, hygiene, medical treatment, education, and the necessary 
facilities for the establishment of a family; 
 
2. Ensuring conditions and opportunities of employment for everyone, 
with a view to attaining full employment; placing the means of work at the 
disposal of everyone who is able to work but lacks the means, in the form 
of cooperatives, through granting interest-free loans or recourse to any 
other legitimate means that neither results in the concentration or 
circulation of wealth in the hands of a few individuals or groups, nor turns 
the government into a major absolute employer.  These steps must be 
taken with due regard for the requirements governing the general 
economic planning of the country at each stage of its growth;  
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3. The plan for the national economy, must be structured in such a manner 
that the form, content, and hours of work of every individual will allow 
him sufficient leisure and energy to engage, beyond his professional 
endeavor, in intellectual, political, and social activities leading to all-round 
development of his self, to take active part in leading the affairs of the 
country, improve his skills, and to make full use of his creativity;   
 
4. Respect for the right to choose freely one's occupation; refraining from 
compelling anyone to engage in a particular job; and preventing the 
exploitation of another's labor;  
 
5. The prohibition of infliction of harm and loss upon others, monopoly, 
hoarding, usury, and other illegitimate and evil practices;  
 
6. The prohibition of extravagance and wastefulness in all matters related 
to the economy, including consumption, investment, production, 
distribution, and services;  
 
7. The utilization of science and technology, and the training of skilled 
personnel in accordance with the developmental needs of the country's 
economy;  
 
8. Prevention of foreign economic domination over the country's 
economy;  
 
9. Emphasis on increase of agricultural, livestock, and industrial 
production in order to satisfy public needs and to make the country self-
sufficient and free from dependence.176 
 
From its inception, isolationism, namely the rejection of foreign involvement, 
remains firmly entrenched in the building blocks of Iran’s key economic institutions.  At 
the same time Article 44 of the constitution authorizes the state ownership of all major 
industries and resources: 
The economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to consist of three sectors: 
state, cooperative, and private, and is to be based on systematic and sound 
planning. The state sector is to include all large-scale and mother 
industries, foreign trade, major minerals, banking, insurance, power 
generation, dams and large-scale irrigation networks, radio and television, 
post, telegraph and telephone services, aviation, shipping, roads, railroads 
and the like; all these will be publicly owned and administered by the 
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State. The cooperative sector is to include cooperative companies and 
enterprises concerned with production and distribution, in urban and rural 
areas, in accordance with Islamic criteria. The private sector consists of 
those activities concerned with agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, 
trade, and services that supplement the economic activities of the state and 
cooperative sectors. Ownership in each of these three sectors is protected 
by the laws of the Islamic Republic, in so far as this ownership is in 
conformity with the other articles of this chapter, does not go beyond the 
bounds of Islamic law, contributes to the economic growth and progress of 
the country, and does not harm society.177 
As a result, “all private banks, insurance companies and the private industry 
owned by 51 industrialists were nationalized by the government in 1979.”178  The 
consequences of which would materialize during the implementation of several Five Year 
Plans for economic growth and development. 
The Constitution placed further restrictions on the enablers of a global economy, 
namely foreign direct investment, by expanding the powers of the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly under Article 81: 
The granting of concessions to foreigners for the formation of companies 
or institutions dealing with commerce, industry, agriculture, services or 
mineral extraction, is absolutely forbidden.179 
From the beginning, the religious establishment laid the groundwork for an 
isolated Islamic Republic destined to withdraw from an emerging global economy and a 
nearly decade long war with Iraq left Iran’s economic infrastructure in shambles.  The 
death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the selection180 of Ali Khamenei to Supreme leader 
coupled with the election of fellow cleric Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as president of 
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the Islamic Republic signaled the beginning of an Iranian thermidor, “the closing phase 
of a revolution wherein hard-line revolutionaries are increasingly challenged by 
reformists and revisionists as a result of backlash to revolutionary policies.”181 
2. The Rise of the Pragmatists from 1989-1996 
The pragmatist platform in Iran centered around economic growth, government 
accountability, improved standards of living and better foreign relations with an emphasis 
on nationalism, development, reconstruction and state building.  The promotion of these 
fundamentals would be essential in bringing Iran back from “a war-ravaged country with 
an equally moribund economy,”182 however the constitution, as written in 1979, created a 
structure that Khamenei described as “an ineffective system of accountability because it 
was impossible to know whom to blame.”183  Constitutional reforms in 1989 took “a 
weak and divided executive branch headed by a president with more ceremonial powers,” 
to create an office that “has at his helm a powerful president.” For the next eight years 
this position would be held by a member of the ulama, Hojjat ol-Islam Rafsanjani.   
To bring the state-controlled Iranian economy suffering from high inflation and 
unemployment, an overreliance of subsides, and decreased productivity in the energy and 
industrial sectors back from its disastrous state, Rafsanjani began his Five Year Plan of 
economic reform.  As the leader of the pragmatists, he believed “that without a cautious 
rapprochement with the West, and without some degree of privatization of the major 
industries, Iran’s effort to rebuild its war-ravaged economy would fail,”184 yet his 
policies did not fully embrace the free market: 
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…our economic approach is a mixed one; (it is) a pure Islamic economy. 
This economic approach has certain features in common with both the 
Western and Eastern economic systems; however, its principles are based 
on neither;185 
or fall directly in line with the processes necessary to bring about a globalized economy: 
…our economy is independent and original and was designed fourteen 
hundred years ago by our religion. We do not care how cooperatives have 
operated in the world. We adapt them to our religious goals and to Imam 
Khomeini's ideals;186 
despite a call from organizations outside of Iran to help reinvigorate the Iranian economy: 
…given the fact that Iran has a dependent and weak economy, the success 
of reconstruction depends on a policy of cooperation with the industrial 
world and the international economic institutions which have the required 
technological and financial means.187 
While Rafsanjani’s domestic agenda has been supported by the new Supreme 
Leader, Khamenei “has rarely missed an opportunity to emphasize that he is the ultimate 
source of political authority in the Islamic Republic,”188 especially in foreign affairs 
pertaining to Iran’s political economy.   
Opposition from other members of the ulama mounted to the pragmatic approach 
to economic liberalization through “unification of the foreign exchange system, 
decontrolling of prices, elimination of subsidies, emphasis on privatization and reduction 
of government controls over market forces.”189  Rafsanjani’s center-right coalition met 
resistance from the left-wing ulama led by Ayatollahs Mehdi Karrubi and Abdol Karim 
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Ardablili who advocated Khomeini’s “statist policies of nationalization and continued 
Islamization of the economy, regulation of foreign trade and opposed any type of relation 
with the U.S. and the West.”190  Conservative elements of the Tehran Militant Clergy 
Association, led by Ayatollah Mohammed Reza Mahdavi-e Kani placed “social justice 
over development, imports over industrialization and business (the merchants) over 
development.”191 
A reconciliation of the hard-line approach to the Iranian economy advocated by 
Khamenei by the more pragmatic methodology championed by Rafsanjani is met by the 
latter’s “inability or unwillingness to curtail the immense economic power of the ulama-
dominated institutional foundations, whose jurisdictions lie outside the governmental 
domain.”192  This would be challenged by the reform movement under the presidency of 
Mohammed Khatami, also a member of the ulama. 
3. The Reform Movement from 1997-2004 
The reform movement in Iran centered on “the rule of law, increased freedoms of 
political expression and an Islamically guided economic transition towards modernity and 
globalization.”193  The movement began as a response to the failure of the pragmatists’ 
inability to achieve structural changes in the economy due the reluctance of the 
conservative elements lead by Khamenei.  The reformists placed social justice after 
economic independence and viewed a mixed economy as the key to development and 
self-sufficiency while “recognizing the inefficiencies of the bazaar economy.”194  With 
this approach, Khamenei’s objection to the election of Mohammad Khatami as president 
and subsequent re-election four years later becomes immediately apparent.  A fellow 
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member of the religious establishment was now in a position to directly challenge 
conservative elements.  These elements sought to maintain the ideals of the revolution as 
they saw Khatami’s policies as threatening to the benefits they had received from playing 
“an active role in political decision making and economic activity.”195 
President Khatami’s economic reforms targeting globalization, liberalization, 
corruption, government subsidies and trade regulations were met with resistance by 
conservative elements whose isolationist tendencies dominated Iran’s political 
institutions.  According to the Economist, “between 2000 and early 2004, the Guardian 
Council blocked about 100 bills proposed by the reformist-dominated parliament.”196  
The coalition which brought Khatami to power could not compete with a religiously 
dominated, conservative government body designed to limit the influence of the 
nationally elected president.  In an effort to level the playing field, “two bills proposed by 
Khatami in late 2002 that would have strengthened the powers of the presidency at the 
expense of the Guardian Council and the conservative (and highly politicized) judiciary 
were repeatedly blocked.”197   
Khatami’s tenure denoted a real fracture amongst the ulama in Iranian politics, 
despite the relative powerlessness of the presidency, as the economic reforms set in 
motion during this time will prove difficult for the current conservative block to 
reverse.198  While the price of oil remained high during this period, “the poor 
performance of the economy and adverse effect of the pattern of economic liberalization 
on the less privileged segments of society brought economics to the forefront of political 
discourse.”199  Only the new alliance between secular conservatives and the religious 
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establishment, including the Revolutionary Guard Corps, established by the election of 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, could enact economic policies to further 
isolate Iran from the global economy.   
4. A Return to the Hard Line from 2005-present 
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s constitution created the office of the president, 
however, not until the elections of 2005, did the people of Iran elect a president who did 
not come from the religious clergy.  At that time a vote for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may 
have been a vote against the religious establishment, however, his source of emulation 
(taqlid), or the member of the Shi’a ulama he must follow is Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, a 
hard-line cleric with visions of succeeding Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as Supreme Leader 
of the Islamic Republic.  With this election, the ulama, as keepers of power in Iran, 
“marked the culmination of the clergy’s gradual domination of the electoral process.”200   
The administration’s hard-line platform focuses on the distribution of wealth 
obtained through oil revenues, a continuation of state subsidies, rent-sharing and 
socialization of crucial resources and opposition to the corruptive forces of capitalism.  It 
also seeks to put Iran back on a path away from the liberal economic reforms enacted by 
previous administrations, especially from Rafsanjani and Khatami, through 
“expansionary fiscal and monetary policies aimed at reducing poverty and creating 
jobs.”201   
Despite this objective, the IMF found these polices produced inflationary 
pressures and a labor market unable to keep up with supply resulting in unemployment in 
addition to “economic distortions caused by extensive administrative controls on prices 
and rates of return (interest rates), as well as large subsidies, particularly those on energy 
products.”202  In an attempt at fiscal reform, government policies to reduce subsidies and 
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increase revenue through a value added tax on the bazaari transactions had an adverse 
reaction amongst the population causing riots in the streets and strikes in the marketplace. 
Clerical support for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for his re-election attempt 
in June 2009 remains bitterly divided.  Seeking clerical approval and loyalty for his 
policies is a direct result of being “unable to manipulate the laws of economics to support 
his domestic agenda.”203  Despite receiving an apparent endorsement from Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Khamenei during a speech in August 2008:  
…do not think that this year is your final year. No. Work as if you will 
stay in charge for five years. In other words, imagine that in addition to 
this year, another four years will be under your management and plan and 
act accordingly.204 
and from the chairman of the Council of Guardians, Ayatollah Jannati, on the letter 
Ahmadinejad purportedly sent to President Bush, when he states, “it is spectacular…an 
inspiration from God…it should be read at schools and universities, and repeatedly 
broadcast from the country's radio and TV networks,”205 others have been sharply 
critical.  None more so then former president, current Expediency Council  and Assembly 
of Experts Chairman and Ahmadinejad’s chief opponent in 2005, Ali Akbar Rafsanjani. 
Just after Khamenei gave his endorsement, Rafsanjani followed with, “the 
honorable leader asked us to endure this government for a while, therefore during these 
three years we tolerated the executive branch but we can now say that this period has 
come to an end...now, we can say it’s over.”206  Other members of the Assembly of 
Experts, including Ayatollah Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi Kani, advised his fellow ulama 
not to take responsibility over Ahmadinejad’s policies: 
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…not to fear a single man and say the truth for the sake of God...we are 
not allowed to blame others for the ills of the society...I have told Mr. 
Ahmadinejad not to consider us (the clergy) as an instrument...we are not 
the preachers of the Sultans of the past, and that he should not expect 
praise from our side.207   
Even Ayatollahs without the protection of belonging to Iranian political 
institutions have found fault with Ahmadinejad’s economic policies, as Ayatollah Sanjani 
remarked, “Ahmadinejad is not complying with the will of the people…this is a major 
threat, a big danger.”208 
The question remains if the reformist elements that “were ill equipped (in 2005) 
to succeed in a changed political landscape that was no longer dominated by a head-to-
head contests between hard-line conservatives and prodemocracy forces,”209 can compete 
against these same hard-liners or if the pragmatic-conservatives, lead by Rafsanjani can 
re-establish themselves as populists more concerned with economic and social reforms, 
rather than political restructuring which doomed them in 2005.  
C. FROM POLITICAL ECONOMIC ACTIVISM TO GLOBALISM 
Throughout the history of Iran, the ulama have showcased their willingness and 
ability to affect the political economy of their country taking Iran on a trajectory of 
greater isolation while reducing foreign pressure.  Whether opposing the monarchy 
against tobacco concessions, increasing their influence over their constituency during the 
Constitutional Revolution, or flexing their collective power during the Islamic 
Revolution, the ulama do not hesitate to showcase these capabilities.  Their actions 
during coup d’état and while the Shah attempted to implement land reforms also 
demonstrate the resolve of the ulama to act decisively to protect their own interests – a 
characteristic they continued to display during the post-revolutionary period. 
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In an attempt to resurrect an economy disrupted by a revolution and shattered by a 
nearly decade long war with Iraq, the religious establishment brought Iran into further 
isolation through their new constitution, granting ultimate power over economic 
institutions to the Supreme Leader and his loyal supporters.  Although a period of 
pragmatism began after the death of Khomeini and a reform-minded cleric attempted 
economic liberalization, these efforts were largely undone by a return to power of hard-
line elements within the ulama.  With the ascendency of this faction, Iran would find 
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IV. BEYOND THE MARKET:  FORCES BEHIND 
GLOBALIZATION 
The complex economic interdependency created though globalization can 
overshadow and eventually overcome the ulama’s grip on Iranian power over 
government institutions controlling the political economy.  In an effort to bring Iran to 
the forefront of the regional stage, previous pragmatic and reform-minded leaders 
attempted to institute economic reform policies.  Hard-line elements within the 
government provide opposition to these policies and as a result, Iran does not experience 
high levels of economic growth and development – instead unemployment, inflation and 
economic stagnation persist.  Iran struggles to integrate in the global economy because 
“the leadership of the Islamic government has no comprehension of the globalization 
process, in particular the powerful role of international financial institutions and the brain 
drain of those who possess a more comprehensive grasp of the global economy.”210  
From its inception, Ayatollah Khomeini’s constitutional architects that created the 
institutions which shape the political economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran sheltered 
themselves from the global marketplace. 
The market has yet to fully integrate and expand into Iran, therefore money and 
capital from foreign direct investment does not pour into the Iranian economy – leaving it 
highly dependent on the price of oil, where according to the McKinsey Global Institute 
Energy Demand Model, Iran’s threshold oil price per barrel must remain above 35.50 
U.S. dollars, or else revenue will be insufficient for domestic expenditures.211   As a 
result, critical oil infrastructure is crumbling; while new industries and market expansion 
for manufacturing, textiles, technology and agriculture remain non-existent.  Economic 
sanctions do make a convenient scapegoat either as their effects diminish significantly 
over the long run.212   
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The process of globalization creates a marketplace where intra-governmental 
institutions, non-governmental organizations and multi-national corporations have an 
opportunity to create interdependencies which according to Keohane and Nye should 
reduce the possibility for conflict and increase stability in the region.213   
Foreign companies do not see Iran as a viable market to improve their own 
competiveness.  Iran with its large population and employment pool, and relative 
concentration of cheap labor in urban areas make it a favorable arena for investment.  
However, the religious establishment enforces policies which keep Iran’s participation in 
international institutions at bay, negatively affecting their participation in the growing 
world economy.  Leading studies on economic liberalization and indexes on globalization 
not only place Iran at or near the bottom of their respective lists, but also have 
unfavorable conclusions on Iran’s future prospects of integration into the global 
economy. 
A. COMPLEX ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCIES 
A cohesive international system which cultivates complex interdependencies 
consisting of international institutions, multinational corporations, economic trade blocks 
and non-governmental organizations create the normative economic, political, social and 
humanitarian frameworks which shape today’s world.214  Under this structure the impact 
of Iran’s diminished role in the international system of the early twenty-first century can 
be explained and their impact predicted.  As a nation submits to these interdependencies 
it can reap the benefits of free trade and expect their role in the international system to 
expand, unless the religious establishment holds them back.   
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The significance of developing economic interdependencies centers around and 
emphasizes the importance of how international and domestic economies are related 
especially when the former constrains and directs the latter in an uncertain world of 
increasing global interdependence.215  The economics of international political economy 
are presented as five basic tasks: 
1. A clear sense of why trade takes place among nations and the theory of 
free trade; 
2. Comprehension of how to measure the movement of goods and services 
across borders through the balance of payments; 
3. An understanding of the tools of economic management by 
governments – namely fiscal and monetary policy; 
4. Insight into currency exchanges for international transactions and the 
relationships between these rates and the prices and demand for exports 
and imports; 
5. An explanation into the dynamics of how everything is brought together  
(monetary and fiscal policy, interest rates, exchange rates, financial 
markets and the balance of payments).216 
Using the operational definition of free trade as the flow of goods and services 
between nations without government restrictions, such as tariffs, quotas or regulations, 
production will take place where it is most efficiently done, benefiting all nations.  This 
highlights Adam Smith’s liberal argument for free trade.   Individuals acting within a 
market, rather than statesmen, can better decide what and where to produce.217  Taken on 
a grander scale, if a foreign country can supply a product cheaper than it can be produced 
domestically, then it should be bought from them from produce made domestically in 
which there is some advantage.  Advantages in trade can be achieved through new 
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technology, skill and innovation.  However, when government institutions limit the 
process through control, regulation and expanded religious discourse, then market 
integration and expansion suffer the consequences. 
International institutions guarantee the flow of natural resources to countries 
which demand them through integrated global markets.  The expansion of these markets 
“entails more specialized producers and labors, contract enforcement, security of property 
rights, increased capital and technological growth.”218  As Iran’s economic growth is 
dependent on the availability and distributions of fossil fuels, the less it does to disrupt 
this market driven flow the better as “the more you let market forces rule and the more 
you open your economy to free trade and competition, the more efficient and flourishing 
your economy will be.”219  The complex interdependence brought through globalization 
allows these market forces to thrive. 
B. RANKING IRAN IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
The process of creating accurate measures to assess how integrated a country is in 
the global economy is a difficult endeavor.  Commissioned studies rely on various factors 
and metrics of globalization and apply different weighted values to each of the measures.  
While encompassing more than just an economic component, these studies also report on 
the political, social and informational elements of globalization.  However, no matter the 
methodology utilized by these studies, they all reach the same conclusion – each year 
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Table 1.   Summary of Iran’s Globalization Rankings. 
Index Name Year Ranking of Iran Number of Countries Measured 
A.T. Kearny / Foreign Policy 2003 62 62 
KOF Globalization Index 2003 105 122 
Index of Economic Freedom 2003 75 127 
A.T. Kearny / Foreign Policy 2004 62 62 
KOF Globalization Index 2004 114 122 
Index of Economic Freedom 2004 78 130 
A.T. Kearny / Foreign Policy 2005 62 62 
KOF Globalization Index 2005 113 122 
Index of Economic Freedom 2005 92 141 
A.T. Kearny / Foreign Policy 2006 62 62 
KOF Globalization Index 2006 65 122 
Index of Economic Freedom 2006 80 141 
A.T. Kearny / Foreign Policy 2007 72 72 
KOF Globalization Index 2007 115 122 
KOF Globalization Index 2008 112 122 
Index of Economic Freedom 2008 151 162 
 
The indicators of globalization demonstrate not only Iran’s lack of economic 
integration through trade and foreign direct investment, but also note its political 
disengagement in international organizations as well as its isolationist tendencies of 
personal contact through international trade and tourism.  These indicators aside, Iran 
shows promise on the technology front with increased number of internet connections, 
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users and webloggers bringing Farsi to forth among all languages used online in blogs.220  
The following survey of the three major globalization indexes demonstrate Iran’s difficult 
journey to become integrated into the world’s global economy. 
1.  A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index 
Since 2001, consulting firm A.T. Kearney has partnered with Foreign Policy to 
publish an annual index that measures globalization.  The globalization index initially 
ranked 62 countries comprising 85 percent of the world’s gross domestic product, 
however, in 2007, expanded to 72 countries covering 97 percent of the world’s GDP.  
The methodology analyzes four components of global integration across economic, 
political, personal and technological dimensions.  Each dimension incorporates specific 
indicators such as trade and foreign direct investment, international organizations and 
treaties, telephone, travel and remittances, and internet usage to determine each country’s 
final score. 
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Table 2.   The Numbers Behind Iran’s Disintegration221 
Indicator Number 
Iran’s Rank 
(out of 72) 
Gross Domestic Product $188,479 mil. 32 
Total Trade (share of GDP) 56.6% 55 
Government Transfers (share of GDP) 0% 72 
Foreign Direct Investment (share of GDP) 0.06% 72 
Remittances (share of GDP) 0.26% 71 
Treaties Ratified 5 68 
International Arrivals 1.78 mil. 54 
Minutes of International Phone Usage (per capita) 5.33 66 
Secure Internet Servers (per capita) 0.0000003 63 
Number of Internet Users 7 mil. 25 
Peacekeeping Contributions (share of GDP) 0.0005783% 57 
Membership in International Organizations 8 66 
 
Iran finds itself at the bottom of this index each and every year; hurt by low scores 
in each of the four dimensions (see Table 2).  The index cites a lack of foreign direct 
investment as a result of diminishing investor confidence and ongoing U.S. imposed 
sanctions for its struggling economy.222  It also faults the regime for frequent internet 
crackdowns, and censorship resulting in “the fewest secure servers per capita than any 
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other country measured except for Bangladesh.”223  In the political arena, the transition 
from “a conciliatory Mohammad Khatami for a more isolationist president, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad,”224 continues to keep Iran one of the least globalized countries in the 
world.  Instead of taking steps forward to integrate the economy through international 
trade, growing at a rate of 9 percent per year,225 the regime continues to keep its grip on 
power by limiting Iran’s involvement in an increasingly globalized world. 
2.  KOF Index of Globalization 
Since 2002, KOF, a Swiss consulting firm based in Zurich, publishes an annual 
index of globalization that ranks 122 countries.  This index measures globalization in 
terms of three dimensions:  economic, social and political.  To determine an operational 
definition of globalization, this index combines several scholarly definitions: 
…globalization is the process of creating networks of connections among 
actors at multi-continental distances, mediated through a variety of flows 
including people, information and ideas, capital and goods. Globalization 
is conceptualized as a process that erodes national boundaries, integrates 
national economies, cultures, technologies and governance and produces 
complex relations of mutual interdependence.226 
The economic measures of globalization include long distance flows of capital, 
goods and services, “as well as information and perceptions that accompany market 
exchanges.”227  An important conclusion reached by the KOF index states, “the results 
show that globalization promotes growth, however not on a large scale. The dimensions 
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most robustly related with growth refer to actual economic flows and restrictions in 
developed countries.”228  This is significant in determining Iran’s perpetual bottom 
ranking.   
The government restrictions placed upon the economy by the regime effectively 
limits its ability to participate in the global economy.  Poor data scores under economic 
integration include decreases in actual flows, such as trade, foreign direct investment and 
portfolio investment coupled with increased restrictions over import barriers, tariffs, taxes 
and capital account restrictions earned Iran a rank of 112 out of 122 countries in 2008.  
As the religious establishment continues to enforce economic regulations designed to 
confine Iran, growth is negatively impacted. 
3. Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom 
Taking a broader look at measuring globalization is the Heritage Foundation and 
Wall Street Journal’s Index of Economic Freedom.  Since 1995, this index ranks 
countries in terms of economic freedom spread across ten dimensions of freedom.  These 
dimensions, “each of which is vital to the development of personal and national 
prosperity,”229 include business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, monetary 
freedom, government size, investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights, 
freedom from corruption and labor freedom.  Based on these components, the authors 
arrive at their operational definition of economic freedom as: 
…that part of freedom that is concerned with the material autonomy of the 
individual in relation to the state and other organized groups. An 
individual is economically free who can fully control his or her labor and 
property. This economic component of human liberty is related to—and 
perhaps a necessary condition for—political freedom, but it is also 
valuable as an end in itself,230 
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where, 
the highest form of economic freedom provides an absolute right of 
property ownership; fully realized freedoms of movement for labor, 
capital, and goods; and an absolute absence of coercion or constraint of 
economic liberty beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and 
maintain liberty itself.231 
From this definition, the ranking of Iran near the bottom of this index becomes apparent. 
In 2008, Iran ranked 151 out of 162 globally and 17 of 18 in the Middle East and 
North Africa ahead of only Libya.232  A combination of decreased economic and political 
liberalism caused a slip in over seventy positions over the course of one year.  The index 
cites Iran’s government as not only weak and inefficient, but also despondent in pursuing 
an economic policy of “self-defeating statism where protectionism and price controls 
have led to double-digit tariffs and double-digit inflation.”233  The table below reflects 
the translation of ineffective, restrictive economic policies which keeps tariff rates high, 
imposes non-tariff barriers impeding trade and foreign investment alike while promoting 
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Table 3.   Numbers Behind Iran’s Limited Economic Freedom.235 
Economic Freedom 44%236 
GDP Growth (2005) 4.4% 
Unemployment (2005) 11.6% 
Inflation of Consumer Price Index (2005) 12.1% 
Net Flow of Foreign Direct Investment (2005) -$46.0 million 
External Debt (2005) $21.3 billion 
Exports (2004) $18.2 billion 
Imports (2004) $14.9 billion 
Weighted Tariff Rate (2004) 13.8% 
 
Iran’s backwards slide in the economic freedom is likely to continue as long as 
the regime continues the trend of reversing of Khatami’s efforts to reform the state 
dominated economy.  From 2005 to mid 2008, revenues from soaring oil prices helped 
mask a struggling economy, however if oil prices dip, the regime will have to look to 
other forms of revenue to stimulate growth, or the religious establishment will have a 
political economy that “remains burdened by high unemployment, inflation, corruption, 
costly subsidies, and a public sector that is both bloated and inefficient.”237 
C. INSTRUMENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR LINKING ECONOMIES 
Though a resistance to modernization through the process of globalization exists 
within the conservative leadership of the religious ranks, market forces and pressures 
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from the global economy exerted upon Iran will transcend the traditional ideologies and 
usher in a new era of economic growth within the Islamic Republic.  Signs declaring 
“Iran Open for Business” illustrate the promise that lies in an economy supported by 11.5 
percent of the world’s proven oil reserves along with 14.9 percent of natural gas 
reserves.238  Despite being flush with petrodollars, the energy sector covers less than a 
third of Iran’s economy.  Present are other, more ominous indicators of an isolated, 
struggling economy. 
These indicators of the instruments responsible for linking economies include an 
environment that encourages foreign direct investment and seeks trading partners and 
agreements.  In Iran, however, the decline in trade amongst its largest trading partners as 
well as the imposition of both unilateral and multilateral economic sanctions has not only 
negatively affected the principle driver of an integrated global economy, FDI, but also 
hampered its ability to enter into free trade agreements and gain membership in 
international institutions.   
1. Foreign Direct Investment 
Despite limitations placed on foreign direct investment by the Iranian Constitution 
and the insistence of the Supreme Leader to keep Iran sovereign and free from foreign 
intervention, acts promoting foreign direct investment have made their way into law.  The 
most significant of which is the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act 
(FIPPA) of 2002,239 “designed to encourage foreign investment into the non-oil sector, 
while providing a firmer framework for the operations of international oil companies.”240  
This law super ceded the Law for the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investments 
(LAPFI) of 1955 which established the legal framework of Iran’s acceptance of foreign 
investment under the Shah.  Only two years removed from the coup d’état that expelled 
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the nationalist prime minister Mohammed Mosaddeq from office, the LAPFI created an 
environment in Iran much more conducive to foreign investment – one that Ayatollah 
Khomeini sought to eliminate after the revolution. 
Although the Islamic Revolution effectively ended the provisions for foreign 
investment under LAPFI, a new law specifically addressing foreign direct investment had 
not yet been drafted.  Along with the economic reforms introduced by President 
Mohammad Khatami, the parliament wrote an initial draft for a law detailing the 
promotion of foreign investment.  As with most laws regarding the expansion of Iran’s 
role in the global economy, arguments over the extent of the law developed between the 
Majlis and the religiously controlled Council of Guardians.  The ulama on the Council 
rejected two initial drafts of the new law citing its incompatibility with not only the 
Constitution, but also with Islamic law.  Their objections included the definitions of 
foreign entities, restrictions on the acquisition of entire industries, limitations on the 
number of shares a foreigner could own, and insurances that there is no possibility of 
foreign domination and intrusion to public interest.241  Due to these differences, the 
Expediency Council acted as a mediator before the final version passed and became 
implemented as law. 
The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, took a cautious approach to a law 
seeking to open Iran to “foreign  investment  in  all  areas  of  economic   activities   by  
foreign  persons  including  real  persons  as   well as  juridical  entities.”242  To him, the 
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In order to attain independence and achieve national sovereignty and 
honor, any nation will have to pay a certain price. But nations should incur 
such expenses and make every effort to achieve the above objectives. 
They should be hopeful of the valuable results of their endeavors, despite 
all the attempts that are being made by the enemies to undermine their 
hopes and aspirations.243 
Foreign intervention on the Iranian economy during the Pahlavi regime not only 
had a negative connotation, but also helped provide a basis of support during the 
revolution; one not likely to be repeated during Khamenei’s lifetime.  The source of his 
power remained in the control of state-run economic institutions and resources and loss 
of that control translates to a loss of power.244   
One of these institutions designed to maintain a firm grip on power over foreign 
direct investment is the Trade Promotion Organization of Iran (TPOI) formed in 2004.  
As a part of the Forth Five Year Plan (2005-2009), the stated core functions of the TPOI 
include implementing trade policy, trade promotion, and trade facilitation by achieving 
foreign trade development, creating export markets for Iranian goods and services, 
providing assistance to Iranian subject matter experts, fostering competitiveness and 
market development with an emphasis on social justice.245 
As a fundamental principle of an Islamic economic system, upholding social 
justice remains paramount.  Any organization, whether governmental or non-
governmental, established to improve Iran’s economic development by attempting to 
increase its stake in international trade while promoting interaction with the global 
economy by encouraging competition and reducing anti-trust policies must do so under 
the strict supervision of the Supreme Leader.  Khamenei has made clear that: 
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Islam disapproves of the Western model of economic development, which 
brings about economic growth and increases the wealth of certain levels of 
society at the cost of impoverishing and lowering the living standards of 
other social strata.  What Islam pursues is economic development and 
prosperity for all social strata based on social justice.246 
Finding trade partners outside of the Islamic world willing to submit to the 
regulations imposed by the ulama through law may limit Iran’s move to enhance their 
position in the global economy. 
2. Trading Partners and Agreements 
As a result of the Islamic Revolution, the severing of all economic and well as 
diplomatic ties between the United States and Iran forces the Islamic Republic to look 
elsewhere for its trading partners.  Iran has found foreign markets for its goods and 
services in China, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, South Korea and Turkey.  Despite 
isolationist policies aimed at the West some attempts to reach out to regional neighbors 
exist as evidenced by a potential trade agreement between Iran and the countries of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),247 as, “Iran's ambassador to Bahrain, Hussain Amir 
Abdullahian, said in 2007 that his country had entered into negotiations with the GCC on 
forming a free trade area with Iran,”248 however a formalized agreement has yet to come 
to fruition. 
Meanwhile, Iran’s free trade zone, established in 1999, on Kish Island in order to 
“provide good conditions and atmospheres for dialogue between foreign investors and 
Iranian authorities,”249 houses its International Oil Bourse.  This commodity exchange 
opened in early 2008, seeks to rival the existing international mercantile exchanges in 
Dubai, London and New York in an attempt to shift world markets away from 
                                                 
246 Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as quoted by Karim Sadjadpour in  Reading Khamenei: The World View 
of Iran’s Most Powerful Leader, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 9. 
247 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
248 STRATFOR, “Iran:  A Free Trade Zone in the Gulf?” September 13, 2007, 
http://www.stratfor.com (accessed November 1, 2008). 
249 The Embassy of The Islamic Republic of Iran, “Iran’s Free Trade Zones,” 1998, 
http://www.salamiran.org (accessed November 1, 2008). 
 76
petrodollars to some other currency as a method to destabilize the U.S. dollar.250   In an 
attempt to liberalize foreign trade with Iran, other free trade zones have been established 
on Qeshm Island and Chabahar. 
The results of Iran’s efforts to liberalize trade through participation in 
international organizations have been mixed.  Iran’s attempt to join the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) began in 1995, when it was granted observer status; however the 
United States blocked subsequent applications for full membership obtained through the 
accession process up until 2005, when it dropped it objection.  The response from the 
religious establishment moves along ideological lines with positive reactions from the 
reformist camp, while “traditionalists, conservatives and labor-related sectors have 
expressed caution or hostility to the prospects of integration into the global free 
market.”251  The reformers see membership in the WTO “as an opportunity to transform 
the state-dominated economy and boost exports,” while conservatives “express fears of 
foreign exploitation and the destruction of Iranian jobs.”252 
While accession to the WTO “is anathema to the Islamic Republic's state-
dominated and highly politicized economic system,”253 there are members of the ulama, 
such as Ayatollah Jaleddin Taheri – a former leader of Friday prayers in Tehran – who 
see this as an opportunity to reduce the influence of religious hard-liners that he finds 
incompetent and corrupt.  Leaders in Iranian manufacturing and agriculture claim these 
industries do not fear the free market as “WTO membership will make Iran more 
prosperous, like India and China,” and more importantly, “force structural reforms to 
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compel services, banking and manufacturing to become more competitive.”254 To 
achieve the economic liberalization necessary to gain membership, these reforms will be 
“met with severe resistance from vested interests,”255 by conservative elements in the 
ulama that see inclusion in the global market as an avenue for foreign interests to destroy 
the Iranian economy.  To protect Iran, the traditional ulama do not seek exposure to 
global marketplace, instead opting for informal bilateral trade arrangements. 
No formal trade agreement exists between Iran and its largest trading partner the 
European Union (EU) and “although the relationship has significant growth potential, its 
development has been severely hampered by Iran’s ongoing international problems 
causing at 10 percent decline in EU exports to Iran over the past two years.”256  The 
European Commission reports, “negotiations for a Trade and Cooperation Agreement 
(TCA) initiated in 2002 have been on hold since August 2005, when Iran resumed its 
nuclear program.”257  Iran’s nuclear ambitions are not likely to diminish in the near 
future, as Ayatollah Khamenei sees a clear link between technological advancement and 
economic independence: 
They (in the West) are opposed to the progress and development of the 
Iranian nation…they do not want an Islamic and independent country to 
achieve scientific progress and possess advanced technology…they are 
worried about anything that can help the regional nations to achieve 
independence, self-reliance and self-sufficiency…it is hard for the global 
arrogance to accept that the talented Iranian nation has been able to take 






                                                 
254 Vahid Sepehri, “Technocrats and Reformists Square Off Against Conservatives and Labor Over 
WTO Membership,” Radio Free Euope / Radio Liberty 8, No. 26, (July 7, 2005), 
http://www.globalsecurity.org (accessed October 31, 2008). 
255 Jahangir Amuzegar, “Iran's Crumbling Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, (January/February, 2003), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org (accessed November 1, 2008). 
256 European Commission, “Iran: External Trade and Trade Issues,” September 15, 2008, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade (accessed October 20, 2008). 
257 European Commission, “Iran: External Trade and Trade Issues,” September 15, 2008, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade (accessed October 20, 2008). 
 78
of nuclear technology.  They want Iran’s energy to be always dependent 
on oil, since oil is vulnerable to the economic policies of world powers. 
They aim to control other nations with invisible ropes.258 
Iran’s insistence on continuing its nuclear program, despite international 
punishment through economic sanctions will keep them disconnected from the global 
economy. 
3. Economic Sanctions 
Multilateral sanctions imposed by the United Nations (UN) over Iran’s reluctance 
to give up its ongoing nuclear program as well as unilateral sanctions imposed by the 
United States since the 1980s ostensibly hampers Iran’s place as a symbol of influence in 
the Middle East and to a larger extent in the international environment.  The sanctions, in 
effect, inevitably limit Iran from participating fully in the global economy, yet 
globalization weakens the potential impact of sanctions “by increasing the number of 
ways that sanctions can be circumvented,”259 as evidenced by the nearly forty percent of 
Iran’s trade with both the European Union and China combined.  Therefore, despite 
economic sanctions levied by the UN and U.S., these alone do not limit Iran’s 
participation in the global economy, stop their budding nuclear program nor curb their 
support to international terrorism.  The Supreme Leader dismissed their effectiveness and 
utilizes them as a means to reinforce Iran’s self reliance:260 
When those countries imposed sanctions on the Islamic Republic, the late 
Imam Khomeini expressed happiness in this regard and welcomed their 
action.  The late Imam’s reaction was quite meaningful, since because of 
those sanctions the Iranian people turned to their own resources and stood 
on their own feet…today also those countries are threatening to impose 
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sanctions on the Islamic Republic. The situation is still the same, and 
sanctions are not going to have any adverse effect on our country and 
nation.261 
The history of U.S. imposed sanctions on Iran date back to 1979, nine months 
after the Islamic Revolution (see Table 4).  President Carter issued Proclamation 4702 
which placed a ban on all Iranian oil imports to the United States.  Additional executive 
orders (EO) followed which cut off access to Iranian state owned property inside the 
United States and extended the embargo to all commercial imports from Iran.  Following 
the release of the 53 US diplomats held hostage following the seizure of the U.S. 
Embassy in Tehran, President Reagan revoked the embargos, but kept the restriction on 
U.S. property.  This restriction is still in effect today.  The Export Administration Act of 
1984 added Iran to the state sponsor of terrorism list and as part of OPERATION Earnest 
Will, Reagan re-instituted the ban on all Iranian commercial imports, including oil and 
gas. 
The Clinton administration did not shy away from the use of economic sanctions 
towards Iran, as he imposed several additional sanctions as well as strengthened existing 
ones – culminating in the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, which eventually became the 
Iran Sanctions Act, and is now on the books as the Iran Freedom Support Act.  Finally, in 
an attempt to give the sanctions some teeth internationally, Congress passed the Iran 
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Table 4.   History of U.S. Sanctions on Iran. 
Date Sanction Description 
Carter Administration 
November 1979 Proclamation 4702 Banned all Iranian oil imports to U.S. 
November 1979 EO 12170 Blocked all Iranian state-owned property in 
the United States. 
April 1980 EO 12205 Placed an embargo on all U.S. exports to 
Iran. 
April 1980 EO 12211 Banned all imports from Iran, travel to Iran 
and all financial transactions with Iran. 
Reagan Administration 
January 1981 EO 12282 Revoked all previous proclamations and 
Executive Orders. 
January 1984 Export 
Administration Act 
Added Iran to state sponsor of terrorism, 
banned US financial assistance and arms 
sales to Iran and imposed multilateral 
lending restrictions. 
October 1987 EO 12613 Banned all Iranian commercial imports to 
US including oil and gas. 
Clinton Administration 
March 1995 EO 12957 barred US citizens and companies from 
financing, supervising and managing oil 
development projects in Iran. 
April 1995 EO 12959 Expanded previous EO to a total trade and 
investment embargo with Iran. 
July 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions 
Act 
Codified EOs and penalized companies 
which violated the provision.  Congress 
renewed the act in 2001. 
March 2000 Iran Nonproliferation 
Act 
Authorized the imposing of sanctions on 
countries assisting Iran. 
Bush Administration 
September 2006 Iran Freedom 
Support Act 
Codified existing US sanctions on Iran while 
providing flexibility to tailor those sanctions 




U.S. policy towards Iran centers on three main principles.  The first keeps existing 
unilateral sanctions in place with the President’s annual renewal of the declaration of the 
National Emergency with Respect to Iran  (March 2008), the signature of the Iran 
Freedom Act into law, the blocking of Iran’s membership application to the WTO and its 
denial of access to the U.S. financial system.  The second principle seeks additional 
multilateral sanctions applied through the United Nations.  The approval of UN Security 
Council Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803 continue to block key Iranian banks and 
individuals from participating in the international financial system.   
Finally, U.S. policy towards Iran pressures our allies and the international 
community to confront Iran by restricting import and export credits, emphasizing the 
financial and reputational risks of doing business with Iran and by limiting foreign direct 
investment in Iran’s oil and gas sector. Although in the global arena the unintended 
consequences of economic sanctions may be a challenge to assess.  In 2007, the 
Government Accountability Office issued a report on the impact of sanctions on Iran 
which concluded they were difficult to determine citing the growth in Iran’s economy 
and global trade from 1987 to the present.262 
D. THROWING AWAY THE KEYS TO A GLOBALIZED POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 
The ulama seem to recognize Keohane and Nye’s theory of neoliberal 
institutionalism can negatively affect their control over Iran’s political economy.  
According to that theory complex economic interdependency created through the process 
of globalization collide with the ulama’s vision the Islamic Republic.  Their efforts 
effectively limit foreign market integration and expansion into the Iranian economy.  
Despite laws created to encourage foreign direct investment and available institutions to 
promote trade and development, Iran ranks near the bottom of every major index 
measuring participation in the global economy. 
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Patterns of progressive economic decline exist despite increasing oil revenues 
through increased oil prices and “while (Iran’s) economic performance has improved 
over the last several years, there has been little progress made in alleviating poverty or 
unemployment.”263  Other economic factors which contribute to a state unable to define 
its role in a global world economy include high inflation, small business failures, 
decreased trade revenue, capital flight and limited direct foreign investments.  Neither the 
enforcement of multilateral economic sanctions by the United Nations nor bilateral 
sanctions by the United States alone limit Iran’s willingness to partake in the benefits a 
fully integrated economy.  Instead the effect of the ulama’s “ideological policies of 
economic independence which detach Iran from the globalization process and act as an 
obstacle to the transfer of capital, technology and know-how are much to be blamed for 
Iran’s economic ills.”264 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The ulama present themselves as Iran’s principle obstacle as it struggles to cope 
with the pressures placed upon it through the globalization process.  Those that find 
themselves at the top of Iranian political and economic institutions cannot hide behind the 
confines of Islam under an established religious discourse.  The benefits of a globalized 
Iranian economy are found in Islamic economic thought that encourages cooperation 
through trade, understands comparative advantage, protects free markets, creates 
financial markets, supports for profit-seeking ventures and diverse investment 
opportunities within an Islamic paradigm.  Partaking in the world’s global economy 
improves the prospect for furthering social justice.  However, when these prospects that 
highlight the economic mismanagement of the revolution come at the expense of a 
dominant social class – to which the ulama belong, they become suppressed through the 
various mechanism and institutions put in place by those in power. 
The Shi’a ulama of Iran must also balance a perceived loss of authority over the 
very community they seek to control.  Events occurring outside their sphere of influence, 
especially those in Iraq, are likely to cause the Iranian religious establishment to seek 
additional measures of control to secure their place of legitimacy.  Ayatollah Khomeini 
established religious foundations (bonyads) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) as the most important of these measures after the fall of the Shah. 
A. IMPACT OF THE 2003 IRAQ INVASION 
Following the fall of its most principle regional threat of Saddam Hussein in 
March 2003, the ulama of Iran must compete directly with the ulama of a free Iraq to 
become the leading figures of the Shi’a Islam worldwide.  Although in 2007, Foreign 
Policy named Iran the biggest winner following the 2003 U.S. lead invasion in Iraq, 
prompting Vali Nasr to state, “Iran’s Shiite rulers have the war to thank for their 
newfound power.”265   
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For the ulama, the removal of Saddam Hussein from power propped open a door 
to gain entry into Iraq’s shattered bureaucracy, budding political and security apparatuses 
and enduring tribal establishments.  However, the most significant impact is the shift in 
the balance of Shi’a religious power from Iran back to Iraq.  The return to prominence for 
the Shi’a seminary (hawza) in Najaf, Iraq reinforces the central role Iraq’s four grand 
ayatollahs, including Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, play in defining Shi’a Islamic doctrine – a 
position the ulama of Iran covet to preserve their model of an Islamic state. 
If U.S. News and World Report included the top seminaries to study traditional 
Shi’a Islamic doctrine and promotion of current Shi’a thought in its annual rankings, 
Najaf would be at the top of the list, with Qom finishing second.  For centuries the hawza 
of Najaf had been the center of Shi’a Islamic studies, though, under Saddam’s secular 
Sunni Ba’athist rule, the preeminent center shifted to Qom, Iran.  With a virtual gag order 
on Najaf lifted after the invasion, quietist Shi’a religious authorities have begun to voice 
opposition to the principle of the rule of the jurisprudent.  A contemporary of Ayatollah 
al-Sistanti, Ayatollah Muhammad Esehak Al-Fayyadh issued a fatwa, “calling for a 
separation of religion and state, saying that politics was based largely on ‘trickery, 
falsehood, and narrow personal interests’ and that the source of authority could not 
conceivably be simultaneously religious and political.”266  These messages are not lost 
upon the million of Iranians making pilgrimages to holy Shi’a shrines from Baghdad to 
Basra that had once been closed off to them under Saddam. 
Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the ulama face mounting demographic 
pressures deriving from patterns that affect common human activity such as travel, social 
interaction and religious worship as well as unemployment through lack of economic 
productivity.  The Failed State Index found widespread persecution of religious 
minorities in Iran that has deprived millions of faithful the freedom to follow their 
beliefs.267  Other social pressures that the ulama must face in order to keep their firm grip 
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on power originate from skewed population distributions, such as a "youth or age bulge," 
and from divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups.  In 
Iran the median age of the population is 20 or below.  A RAND Corporation study found, 
“this is worrisome in itself, for several reasons, as 'the one generalization demographers 
are willing to make is that youth bulges disrupt the social equilibrium' and are frequently 
associated with political turmoil and social unrest.”268  Increased social problems 
affecting youth are likely to lead to a lifestyle of rebellion and intellectual and political 
protest,269 which as one Iranian dissident argues are the building blocks of effective 
tactics to attain the goal of true democratic transition against the sultanistic Iranian 
dictatorship.270 
B. MEANS OF PROTECTING THE ESTABLISHMENT 
For those ulama that set the political agenda for Iran, upholding the ideals of the 
Islamic Revolution remains the single most important objective.  This is mainly 
accomplished through propagating religious discourse, however, if that fails through the 
use of internal security apparatuses.  
1. Religious Discourse and Its Effect on the Political Economy 
From the revolutionary principles which bore the modern day republic comes the 
preservation of an Ayatollah Khomeini’s vision of an Islamic state where in the absence 
of God’s legitimate rule a jurisprudent carries out God’s command in accordance with 
Shari’a law.271  Not only can the ulama evoke this principle in their vision of Shi’a Islam 
to keep their firm grip on power while the twelfth Imam remains in occultation, but also 
to control all elements of society through the use of religious discourse.   
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By writing commentaries and issuing fatwas the ulama seek to control this 
discourse.  While the former can be accomplished through published volumes of written 
opinions, the latter reaches the masses verbally through traditional Friday prayers.  In 
Tehran, various influential ayatollahs from the Supreme Leader to the head of the 
judiciary, Ayatollah Jannati deliver these prayers, “(as) a means whereby political 
messages could be conveyed to the people and political influence brought to bear.”272  
Vast networks of clerics carry their messages to mosques across the country achieving an 
appearance of unity of thought. 
The methods the ulama use to obtain stated objectives extend beyond the mosque, 
but remain entrenched in post-revolutionary Shi’a Islam.  Religious foundations 
(bonyads) established by the ulama following the seizure of the Iranian national assets 
and enterprises abdicated by the deposition of the Shah now account for 10 percent to 20 
percent of the nation's GDP to a total of 115 billion U.S. dollars in 2003.273  The original 
intent of ulama for the bonyads sought “to redistribute to the impoverished masses the 
‘illegitimate’ wealth accumulated before the revolution by ‘apostates and ‘blood-sucking 
capitalists,’”274 through local community and social programs, however those clerics in 
charge of administering these foundations have “have increasingly forsaken their social 
welfare functions for straightforward commercial activities.”275  As a result, clerics such 
as Ayatollah Vaez-Tabasi and Ali Akbar Rafsanjani are considered some of the richest 
men in Iran. 
The money acquired through bonyads, as well as through alms (zakat) – where in 
Shi’a Islam, those who can afford to do so are required to give twenty percent of 
disposable income to their sources of emulation – finds its way into domestic politics.  
Cited by human rights groups and Freedom Watch, corruption remains a vital issue in 
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Iranian clerical political maneuvering.  Despite new political methods new methods 
“openly borrowed from the West,”276 the prospects for transparent democracy remain thin 
when politicians, especially at the local levels, are openly financed by the religious 
establishment. 
2. Internal Security Apparatuses 
The manipulation of the political process by the religious establishment is not 
limited to finance.  The political-military implications of a state influences the populace 
through other means reflects its illegitimacy, poor governance, willingness to suspend the 
rule of law, and a rise in fractionalization of elites through increased security apparatus 
operations.  The source of non-democratic perceptions stems from the Islamic Republic’s 
Council of Guardians together with its Supreme Leader that selects which candidates can 
and cannot run in every election.  The real power of the state lies in unelected Islamic 
clerics, not the “elected” president.   In a study on the quality of governance conducted by 
the World Bank, “Iran placed in the bottom quartile and did not score above average in 
any category.”277  These categories included voice and accountability, political stability 
and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and 
control of corruption.   
Inside Iran exists a number of institutions with significant political and military 
power that “operate largely outside of normal state authority,”278 including the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij (people’s militia).  The IRGC is a 
paramilitary organization complete with its own command and control over army, navy, 
air and special forces.  These independent forces work directly for the Supreme Leader 
and are not subordinate to Iran’s regular military forces and have earned a reputation for 
aggressive tactics following more hard-line politics including training and support to 
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Hezbollah in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley279 and recent run-in with U.S. Navy warships.280  
The Basij grew out of the IRGC as a volunteer militia consisting of over 1 million people.  
However, its role has shifted from the significant military force during the Iran-Iraq War 
to that of “domestic repression” evidenced by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s 
appointment of its commander as chief of Iran’s national police force in order to more 
easily “repress against political and social freedoms.” 281 
C. GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
Iran clams the West exploits the geopolitical conditions of globalization in order 
to subvert developing countries.  They argue the political economy of a particular nation 
may not lend itself to free trade, as not all trading benefits are equal, and not all nations 
always gain what they need.  Mercantilists claim this is especially true for developing 
nations.  Developing domestic industries which would fuel the struggling Iranian 
economy would have to be protected from well-established foreign industries or run the 
risk of being destroyed by their inherent inefficiencies and high prices.  Only through 
tariffs, import restrictions and subsides could he assure the success of domestic industries 
to compete not only at home, but eventually abroad.  The revenue received from tariffs 
and subsides properly re-invested in manufacturing would be the best course of action for 
economic growth.  This can be likened this to the import substitution industrialization 
policies which characterized the Asian tigers in the 1970s and 1980s as they applied 
protectionist measures to bolster domestically produced products before unleashing them 
into the world market. 
Countries can use protectionism to strike a political balance between a 
commitment to freer trade and the economic damage it can have on inefficient domestic 
producers.  Political organization for protection is easier than for free trade as it allows 
the costs of protection to be spread across many consumers.  After all, free trade is a hard 
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sell in a depressed world economy.  The continuing expansion of international trade lead 
to a growing interdependence of national economies which meant shared economic 
fluctuations, however, the benefits derived during periods of growth can shelter an 
economy during periods of recession.  For Iran, not participating in the global economy 
has meant the revenues collected while the price of oil was high have not been reinvested 
in infrastructure or capital improvements, but instead wasted on subsides and inefficient 
government programs. 
D. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Iran is caught in a precarious position as the forces of globalization move 
throughout the world. While the merits of globalization and free trade bring about 
economic growth and development, it carries a stigma of vulnerability which includes 
cultural change, uncertainty and political instability.  With globalization comes a mixing 
of markets, culture and nations to create a new social order – in direct conflict with the 
one established and maintained since 1979.   
In a country that does not particularly respond well to change, globalization is 
likely to make certain members of the ulama uncomfortable.  To accept globalization 
would be to abandon their traditional social and economic values.  U.S. economic policy 
towards Iran plays squarely into the hands of the religious establishment.  A policy that 
isolates Iran through economic sanctions is exactly complimentary to the Supreme 
Leader’s strategy of keeping Iran isolated.  For the West to openly challenge the ulama 
by exposing Iran to the forces of globalization has the potential to not only integrate Iran 
to the global economy, but also acts as a check on the ulama’s power by perhaps 
increasing its prospects for greater political liberalization. 
In the face of massive and unrelenting changes in the modern world, insight in to 
the decision processes of the traditionally educated ulama remains vitally important and 
of great interest to anyone seriously interested in understanding contemporary Muslim 
societies.  Through this understanding can questions pertaining to the future of Iran’s 
position in a globalizing world economy and international system can be answered. 
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